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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study compares repair responses by individuals to a damaged high rise wind 
frame. Individuals are experienced high rise structural engineers and constructors. Solutions 
are indexed. Comparisons are made between individuals by experience levels and 
professionals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1       The Problem 
 The progressive collapse of high-rise buildings is a theoretical issue that has evolved 
to urgent reality.  The high-rise power symbolism that has permeated our culture in the last 
century has been co-opted by darker forces as a negative expression of their power. The reason 
that we build high-rises is the same reason that others will attempt to destroy them.   
 While local and national disaster management is prepared to deal with the aftermath of 
a total vertical collapse, there is no specific planning to deal with a structurally crippled tall 
building, poised to collapse under wind loading or additional damage.  The World Trade Center 
(“WTC”) on 9/11 had three buildings severely crippled.  Two of the high-rises survived for an 
hour or more and the third survived a day.(1) 
 With viable technologies to deal with the fire and temporary repair of the structure, 
there is the possibility that all three buildings could have been saved.  It has been well argued 
that WTC 7 should have been saved with existing technology (resulting in a lawsuit) and that 
only faulty decision making led to its collapse after fire weakened its foundations for a full 
day.  The problem is by definition an engineering management issue, and this study will 
approach it from the initial key decisions that must be identified and solved to prevent a greater 
and perhaps catastrophic disaster. 
 The potentially progressive nature of this type of event introduces time as a critical 
component of the study.  The stabilization or removal of the building must be accomplished 
before weather or other conditions can increase the damage to such a degree that overloading 
of the remaining structure results in total collapse. 
 At least seven high-rise buildings have collapsed in recent decades after weakening of 
their structural systems by fire or construction error.  The failures at WTC (three) collapsed 
straight down as their structural frames provided a vertical channeling for the accordion-like 
collapse.  A much greater theoretical risk, however, is posed by a toppling failure of a tall 
building.  This type of collapse could be the result of (1) the building’s being pushed over by 
external forces (wind or foundation failure), or (2) multiple column failures on one side of the 
building, or (3) a combination structural failure and overturning moment such as wind and 
foundation failure.  In any of these events, the entire building would lean to an extreme degree 
in one direction, causing progressive overload of columns and eventual toppling of the building 
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as a coherent unit, not unlike a tree being felled (Figure 1).  To date, several smaller high-rises 
have toppled from various causes, including a 12-story in Selangor, Malaysia on December 
11, 1993(2), a 13-story in Shanghai, China on June 27, 2009(3) and most recently, a 20-story on 
January 26, 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  The 20-story building toppled into an adjacent 10-
story building and collapsed it, as well as a 4-story building(4). 
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Figure 1 - Progressive Failure of Columns. The left profile shows a single column severed 
near the midpoint of a multi-story building.  The weight previously carried by that column 
shifts to the immediately adjacent columns.  If the addition of the shifted weight exceeds the 
capacity of any of the adjacent columns, then they will also fail.  The combined weight from 
the two failed columns will then redistribute to adjacent columns and collapse a third 
column, etc.  The building begins to lean and weight is shifted onto the remaining columns in 
what is referred to as the P-Delta lever.(5) 
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 For this exercise, the relevant theory is progressive failure of columns in a long span, 
rigid-frame, tall steel building:  The initial failure of one or more columns of the exterior rigid 
“cage” results in load shifting to adjacent columns and their subsequent failure from the 
overload.  The loading on the columns would be a combination of gravity loading from 
building and occupant weight, with concomitant building movement induced by wind loading.  
Once the building leans in a direction, it is pushed into toppling by a combination of what is 
referred to as the P-Delta lever of its off-centered weight and building sway from wind force.  
Initial progression of the column failures may be continuous or intermittent. More specifically, 
progressive failure of the rigid-frame of high rise columns will normally be dependent on 
several conditions.   
 First, the subject building’s spans between columns must be large, probably 25 feet or 
more.  Lesser distances increase the chance of the remaining beams and columns forming an 
impromptu truss over the damaged column, as occurred at WTC 1 and 2, thereby preventing 
the building from immediately collapsing.     
 Second, gravity-loading alone will normally not be sufficient to trigger a progressive 
collapse from a single severed column.  Additional wind-loading will probably be required to 
cause the failure of the second, and perhaps, the third column.  At that point, the transferred 
gravity-loading will be adequate to continue the sequence.  If two or three columns are severed 
concurrently, however, then the wind loading would not be necessary.  Once several columns 
have been severed or have collapsed, the P-Delta lever takes effect.  The missing columns and 
the sagging structure above will cause the building to lean to the damaged side.  This lean 
translates in engineering calculation to an overhang, and further increases the loading on the 
remaining columns under the lean (P-Delta lever).   
 Third, the most efficient point (considering effort and degree of damage) for triggering 
progressive failures is not near the top or bottom of the building.   Rather, it will usually fall 
between the 1/4 and 1/2 point of the building and will vary with the height and design of the 
structure.   Lower points will encounter much heavier structure to cut, while higher points will 
theoretically reduce the damage. 
 These variations in the failure analysis will normally require an experienced structural 
engineer to determine whether the severance of a particular column may produce progressive 
failures. The key issue is whether the exterior frame topples before the interior floors collapse 
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downward.  If so, the building will topple; if not, the building will collapse upon itself as did 
the WTC. If a single (or multiple) column failure(s) leads to progressive failure of columns 
and progressive collapse in a toppling mode, this can trigger a sequential collapse of multiple 
buildings. This domino model of sequential building collapse stems from the toppling failure 
of a single building:  If a collapsing building applies lateral force to a neighboring building, 
the weights may be of such magnitude as to cause compression failure in the columns on the 
opposite side of the impacted structure or a lateral failure of bracing 90o to the loading.  If so, 
the neighboring building may topple with the first and possibly impact a third building in a 
similar manner (see Figure 2).  This model appears account for to the multiple failures in Rio 
de Janeiro previously mentioned, although these buildings were relatively small.(6) 
 A variation of the domino model is that the collapsing building does not impact the 
second building high enough to push it over, but damages the base columns and delivers a 
“kick” to the base of the second structure, causing it to topple back toward the first building.  
(See Figure 3). 
 Because of the possibility of a domino reaction, a toppling failure poses a significant 
threat to neighboring buildings over a large radius.  In an extreme example, it is theoretically 
possible that the failure of one or two columns in certain buildings could translate into the 
sequential failure of multiple high-rises. 
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Figure 2 - Domino Model Type I, Direct Topple.  The primary building shown in Figure 1 
topples against a neighbor and results in the failure of lateral bracing or overloading of 
columns on the opposite side. 
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Figure 3 - Domino Model Type II, Unpinning Collapse.  A second type of sequential collapse 
damages the columns at the base of an adjacent building and it collapses back on the first.  This 
scenario is more likely to involve a building several hundred feet away. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The study of decision-making in preventing a high-rise building collapse scenario has 
no literature of record.  Relevant research is logically divided into two contributing branches.  
The first is literature of hundreds of historical terrorist actions, which points to relevant terrorist 
criteria for future actions.  This historical evolution will test (or question) any assumptions as 
to whether a given scenario is compatible with the historical context of terrorist actions.  
Second, with the resulting theory of a future attack scenario, the research literature of decision-
making relevant to that scenario can be identified and discussed. 
 
2.1       The History of Terrorist Attacks on Buildings 
 There is a master source of terrorist incidents research that grew from a Yale University 
dissertation by Edward F. Mickolus and published in 1980 as “Transnational Terrorism.”(7) 
This work has been expanded by the original researcher and several collaborators to five 
volumes and includes reports on over ten thousand terrorist incidents, , Mickolus, Sandler, and 
Murdock (1989(8) and 1997(9)) Mickolus1993(10) , and Mickolus and Simmons(11) (1997).  
Examination of these files reveals about three hundred significant attacks on government, 
institutional, commercial and industrial buildings.  These reports, together with additional 
reports involving building failures, yield seven conclusions. 
 First, historical patterns of attacks on buildings indicate that terrorists learn from 
failures, experimenting until a successful result is obtained, and then repeatedly using that 
technology.  If some aspect is blocked by defensive strategy or material availability, they alter 
their methods, materials and even objectives as necessary.  But the combined worldwide effort 
of terrorists to destroy architecture never ceases. 
 Second, in the past century, attacks on buildings have targeted increasingly larger 
structures.  The destruction technology of buildings, however, has lagged several decades 
behind the construction technology of tall buildings.  While the vast majority of these attacks 
have employed the use of explosive devices, terrorists have not developed explosive 
technology for high rises.  The major attacks appear to occur on roughly an eight to twelve 
year cycle. 
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 Third, the attack on the King David Hotel, in 1946, introduced to terrorists the military 
engineering concept of destroying individual structural members as an effective means of 
destroying large buildings.(12) 
 Fourth, the barricade and hostage scenario developed by Armenian terrorists in 1896, 
and repeated worldwide, provides a simple method to control one or more floors of any 
building while demolition personnel prepare to cut structural members.(13)(14) 
 Fifth, no damaged mid-rise or high-rise building has ever been left in a precarious 
position requiring emergency structural intervention to protect other high-rises.  This absence 
precludes a literature of factual experience in the stated problem. 
 Sixth, in 1993, Ramzi Yousef developed the concept of toppling WTC I into other 
buildings.  Theoretically, a toppling failure of WTC I and II could have reached for a fifth of 
a mile, destroying everything in its path and possibly initiating secondary toppling failures.  
Although he had knowledge of explosives, Yousef lacked education in the technical 
application of explosives to tall buildings and his attack failed.(15) 
 Seventh, there may be an, as of yet, unidentified rule that is directing the long-term 
advancement of effectiveness in terrorist actions.  Stated broadly, anti-architectural terrorism 
is ultimately seeking the maximum cultural impact for the minimum technical effort.  When 
this “holy grail” is reached, it could be repeated indefinitely until either the cultural icon (high-
rise architecture) is discredited as functional (desirable) architecture, or the technical effort 
required of the attackers is no longer a minimum value compared to other effort/results ratios.  
Historically, the evidence for the holy grail of terrorism goes beyond any one terrorist cause.  
The termination of one cause only prepares the way for the next group to assume the quest. 
 In addition to the Mickolus research, review of other technical sources lends credence 
to the idea that emergencies eventually will arise that require immediate structural repair.  To 
wit, technical instructions in U.S. Military engineering texts (U.S. Army Field Manual 5-25(16) 
and U.S. Army Handbook SH21-76)(17) and U.S. Army Engineering Center classes at Ft. 
Leonard Wood, Missouri, teach that steel and concrete structures can be collapsed with 
directed efforts against one or more individual structural members.  Military veterans with a 
demolition Military Occupation Specialty know this information.  In such an attack, failure to 
achieve immediate collapse may result in a crippled building that is vulnerable to progressive 
collapse from wind action over a period of time. 
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 Although large aircraft have been substantially secured from terrorist use as weapons 
of mass destruction, smaller private aircraft, including multi-engine business jets remain easily 
accessed, due to fewer security provisions and the availability of legal lease and rental aircraft.  
Damage from the 2001 WTC plane attack indicates that high-speed jets are uniquely suited to 
cutting structural columns.  It also appears likely that a high-speed impact by a business jet 
will be capable of severing some columns depending on the point of impact, although the 
reduced fuel load of smaller jets decreases the possibility of immediate building collapse.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that the building will be left crippled and vulnerable to collapse 
unless prompt action is taken to repair or demolish the building in a controlled manner. 
 Other simple weapons exist that have not yet been deployed against high rises at this 
time.  Heavy weight vehicles, including loaded concrete trucks, armored military vehicles, and 
railway locomotives have the mass to sever or crumple a single high-rise column.  There are 
multiple locations where roads and railroads run under or adjacent to high rises.  According to 
the U.S. Army Field Manual 5-25, trucks containing high-temperature fuels (over 2000 degrees 
F.) have the potential of inducing temperature failure in exposed steel columns and beams that 
require only ten minutes at 1000 degrees F and somewhat longer if protected by common 
sprayed-on fire insulation such as used at the WTC.  In these events, prompt repair and 
demolition decisions will be needed. 
 In addition, military engineering knowledge is widely available due to the unfortunate 
long-term availability of U.S. military engineering manuals in the army surplus and gun show 
market in the United States.  The availability of highly qualified foreign military engineers 
from nations that support terrorism compounds this problem.(18) 
 In summary, the historical record, common demolition practices, and military 
engineering texts give evidence of the effectiveness and feasibility of cutting individual 
structural members on high-rise buildings as a means of destruction.  Vehicle bombings are 
not as effective on high-rise structural systems as they are on mid-rises and large aircraft are 
increasingly secured against terrorist hijacking.  Combine this information with the long-term 
terrorist efforts towards attacking increasingly large buildings and a covert action or a 
barricade-hostage situation involving the severing of individual columns becomes increasingly 
logical as a likely terrorist action. 
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 Furthermore, it should be understood that engineers normally cannot exactly predict 
the reaction of a high-rise building to the removal of a column.  In particular, engineers will 
have difficulty in predicting a building’s impending failure without extensive time (days) to 
minutely analyze, quantify and calculate the effect of the damage. 
 These observations suggest that the column failure scenario could arise as a result of 
one of the following: 
1) A poorly planned or interrupted terrorist effort in which the building does not 
collapse as planned and is left crippled requiring immediate repair, or  
2) A deliberately limited attack designed to create a long-term impending collapse 
situation in a downtown high-rise district, or 
3) A deliberately limited attack on key structural members, which allows a high wind 
to provide the additional overturning moment, thereby completing the collapse of 
the building. 
 The rationale underlying these attacks would be to induce column failure in a high-rise 
wind frame in such a manner that adjacent columns are overloaded and/or critical structural 
joints are subjected to greatly increased stresses to the point of failure.  The failure of each 
column or joint, in turn, could increase the allowed movement of the building in normal wind 
forces over a period of hours or days.  A severe wind load could cause the building to go from 
a slow progressive failure into an immediate toppling failure.  If there is no significant wind, 
the continued building movement in a mild wind could eventually flex the most highly stressed 
frame connections to the point of failure.  If this failure occurs in a contiguous area of high-
rises, a toppled forty-story building could trigger successive domino collapses of adjacent high-
rises.  Consequently, in any contiguous area of high rises in which a single column in one 
building is severely damaged to the point of risk building failure, the entire contiguous area of 
tall buildings will require evacuation until the damaged building is at least stabilized for the 
plausible wind loads.(19)  Such a consequence from a minor event could hold momentous 
implications for the American system of tall compacted city centers and future real estate 
values of these core value areas. 
 This low effort (cut one column), high impact (the threat to multiple high-rises) terrorist 
strategy is easily replicated once the concept has been established by action. It is an action that 
is difficult to prevent, but if implemented, may require a unique engineering reaction in a short 
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response time to avert catastrophe.  Moreover, there is no record in the engineering literature 
of high-rise short-term emergency repair studies or the record of an actual event with a tall 
building in actual practice.  
 There have been several buildings judged weak in wind framing, and programs carried 
out to correct the problem.  Colaco, Ford, and Robertson(19) described a massive restructuring 
of a high-rise wind frame, but the planning and construction required years.  Effective 
retrofitting of high-rises to thwart terrorists is largely theoretical and would certainly be 
expensive.  To date, there has been only one known major structural retrofitting of a high-rise 
to thwart terrorism.  The lower eight floors of a 51-story building (from foundation) received 
a massive reinforcement against large exterior vehicle bombs and very high-strength composite 
concrete column encasement was carried up 50 floors in conjunction with a wind retrofit.  Such 
efforts require about one-half million dollars per floor to protect key external members and the 
wind frame from deliberate damage scenarios.  While this addition provides damage protection 
for individual steel columns and increases resistance to progressive wind frame collapse, it 
cannot eliminate vulnerability altogether.(20) Measures developed on this project have been 
used on several new high rises since that project.  A similar reinforcement of a Manhattan high-
rise by Harvard Professor William Lemeasure(21) was also a critical project but, again, the 
response time was years rather than days.  Neither building was reported to have actually 
suffered any damage from wind loading. Earthquake bracing adds to the likelihood of 
incomplete failure.  Successful attacks would be more difficult in earthquake zones. 
 The most similar engineering situation may well be the Tacoma Narrows Bridge 
collapse in the state of Washington prior to World War II.  Levy and Salvatori(22) have noted 
that America’s third longest bridge had shown itself to be remarkably unstable in moderate 
winds even during construction.  Given the nickname “Galloping Gertie,” studies were 
launched and consultants brought in to attempt to stabilize the structure.  The engineers, led by 
Professor F. B. Farquharson, were unable to move quickly enough to resolve the problem and 
the bridge destroyed itself in a moderate wind on November 7, 1940, as the professor watched 
and a movie camera recorded the now famous scene.  It is particularly significant that the 
engineering response required months and events moved faster than the response. 
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2.2       Decision Making Literature 
 The available research literature on decision-making does not directly relate to the 
problem of immediate emergency engineering decisions concerning building structures, which 
constitute the key element of this study.  Such crisis decision-making situations fall outside the 
normal engineering decision-making procedures as studied in college and practiced in 
professional offices.  Situations demanding rapid judgment rather than painstaking analysis 
could be considered the very antithesis of normal engineering practice, which stresses a full 
evaluation of the problem with the best available means.  Time available is not normally 
dictated to the engineer; rather the engineer dictates the time required. 
 The most relevant available information on high stress, time constrained decision-
making by experts is in the following categories of research: 
1. Decision-making in dynamic task environments.  Dynamic task environments are 
ones in which various aspects of the problem or its environment change during the 
exercise.  The column failure scenario is a dynamic task environment changing 
during the exercise and the resulting decision-making has certain unique 
characteristics that Korsthell and Raaijmanors (23) identify as follows: 
a) Change over time requires that the time element be taken into account 
explicitly.  Indeed, the changing environmental itself defines time pressure in 
dynamic environments.  Brehmer(24) had noted that decision-making in studies 
should be made in real time, the concept being that distorting the available time 
to make a decision in real time can alter the decision-making process. 
b) Availability of feedback is a critical feature of a dynamic decision task and 
divides into action-oriented strategies (reacting to observed change) or 
judgment-oriented strategies (which researches underlying performance 
deterioration). 
c) Complex dynamic situations require multiple interdependent decisions that 
affect the system under control or attempted control, as well as decisional 
reaction to autonomous developments within that same system. 
2. Time pressured decision-making.  A major factor in many decision-making 
situations is a lack of time to thoroughly analyze the situation, evaluate alternative 
courses of action, and implement a strategy.  The column failure scenario is driven 
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by a severe lack of time in all three areas - situation analysis, alternative evaluation, 
and strategy implementation. 
a) Hogarth and Karelaia(25) note that linear decision-making assumes that people 
can integrate all available information and act rationally upon it.  This linear 
cognitive ability (skill) depends on having the time available to gather and 
process information.  An implication of their analysis is that people do not need 
much computational ability (skill) to make accurate judgments in many cases, 
but they do need knowledge of when to use particular rules or heuristics.  This 
leads to the concept for a particular situation of replacing engineering 
calculations with predetermined rules of thumb as an organized form of 
heuristics in emergency situations. 
b) Zakay and Wollner(26) demonstrated that time pressure negatively impacted the 
subjects’ ability to use a learned strategy for optimum results and the quality of 
decision-making suffered.  This result may correlate to normal engineering 
problem-solving as a learned strategy for seeking unconstrained optimum 
values rather than seeking an adequate strategy within a limited time frame, i.e., 
Simon’s(27) concept of “satisficing”. 
c) Also of interest are studies that show an increase in time pressure results in 
subjects reducing their risk-taking in decision-making.(28, 29)   
3. The effects of expertise on dynamic decision-making. 
a) The definition of expertise has been studied and discussed in scientific literature 
for decades with a failure to reach consensus.  Cellier(30), citing Shanteau(31), 
and Fischer(32), stated that “it is not possible to provide a consensual and 
operational definition of expertise.”  There was agreement on one issue, that 
expertise was domain specific.   
b) There are ten characteristics of expert performance: (1) Expertise is domain 
specific because the foundation of expertise is an extensive knowledge of a 
specific domain, (2) experts perceive patterns or chunks of information rather 
than individual pieces of information, (3) experts are faster and make fewer 
errors, (4) experts have superior memory in their domain, (5) experts see and 
represent a problem at a deeper level, (6) experts have strong self-monitoring 
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skills, (7) experts have fine perceptual abilities, (8) experts have the ability to 
see typicality, (9) experts have the ability to see fine distinctions, (10) experts 
have the ability to see antecedents and consequences. (30)  
Cellier et al also concluded that experts’ decision-making is based on perceptual 
recognition skills representing an accumulation of experiences with the task.  
Expert decision-makers can distinguish between typical and atypical events and 
make fine discriminations between similar situational factors.  They will also 
be able to generate expectations about how the situation arose and how it will 
evolve. Violations of these expectancies will cause the decision-maker to re-
evaluate the situation. 
c) In a fast-paced, dynamic decision-making situation, experts make decisions on 
a perceptual/heuristic basis rather than the usual conceptual basis that assumes 
extensive study and analysis.  But, this process, in turn, may allow greater 
opportunity for bias on the part of the decision-maker.(31)  If there is evidence 
of continued conceptual thinking under severe time stress, it may raise issues 
regarding the adequacy of the expert’s background experience relative to the 
particular problem. Such findings could indicate a need for special training in 
emergency response to reduce the anticipated bias. 
d) Consistent with the concept of a perceptual basis for expert decision-making, 
experts are found to have a more functional view of the process, and to be 
superior at anticipation and producing inference(33).  Appropriate expertise 
should exhibit these characteristics. 
e) Fox and Clement(34) describe practical procedures for eliciting subjective 
probabilities from experts. In particular, the risk partition dependence and 
pruning bias are discussed as elements that can alter professional judgment. 
4. Emergency response.  Perry and Lindell(35), have identified the four principal 
emergency response functions as: 
 
1. Emergency assessment 
2. Hazard operations 
3. Population protection 
4. Incident management 
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In the context of a potential building collapse, emergency assessment involves 
collecting and evaluating data about the condition of the building and its 
environment (especially weather conditions), as well as forecasting the likely mode 
of building collapse.   
 Hazard operations involves an assessment of expedient methods of preventing 
building collapse or limiting the consequences of a collapse if it should occur.  It 
also involves developing an action plan and implementing it, similar to determining 
stability of buildings and tagging them after earthquakes. 
 Population protection is primarily the issue of determining if a “safe” 
evacuation radius is needed and, if so, what is the required distance.  It also involves 
taking appropriate action to protect emergency workers. 
  Incident management involves coordination among all the affected 
stakeholders, including local government acting through the Fire Department.  The 
primary direction of the emergency response will come immediately from the Fire 
Department’s Incident Commander and eventually the building owner acting 
through his/her engineering consultants. 
5. Decision Studies for Anti-terrorism.  Dillon et al.(36) detailed the ARDA risk-based 
decision-making approach for prioritizing anti-terrorism measures for the U.S. 
Navy.  The study discusses 15 attack modes against 160 facility types and 22 
mitigation alternatives.  There is a limited discussion of cost-effective response and 
the general agreement that an expected value approach is not appropriate for low 
probability, high consequence events.  This would be relevant for a study such as 
the one in which we are engaged. 
6. Decision-Making in Projecting Future Events.  Ezell et al.(37), note that a U.S. 
National Research Council committee has criticized the use of probability to assess 
the likelihood of terrorist events and suggests the use of decision trees in 
combination with probability studies.  The NRC committee recognizes terrorist 
events as actions that can be predicted from their objectives, but studies using this 
approach have not been published to date. 
7. The Fluency and Effort Heuristics.  Traditional decision-making algorithms require 
considerable mental effort and concentration.  Decision-makers have cognitive 
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processing limitations, as well as the constraints of the task environments such as 
time.  This concept is known as bounded rationality.(38) 
 Fluency in cue weighting proposes that participants often weigh information 
according to the ease with which it can be processed.  This is related to the 
availability heuristic which states events that come easily to mind will be judged as 
more likely to occur again in the future.  Thus, fluency can serve as a basis for 
deciding which cues will be weighed most heavily in decision-making.  The authors 
argue that fluency affects cue weighting when validity information is not present 
and that fluency may itself be a proxy for cue validity.(39)(40) 
 The effort heuristic reflects that people judge the value of work by the amount 
of effort that they believe is put into it.  Thus an “easy” solution such as removing 
the windows in the upper stories of a building to reduce wind load, may be seen as 
“too easy” a solution that has less value than welding and restructuring the damaged 
portion of the building.(41) 
 Shah and Openheimer(30) reviewed past studies for summaries of the strategies 
(heuristics) that people use for reducing the effort of decision-making.  They 
concluded that the cues for decision-making have two separate components, a type 
and a value.  An example is the heuristic for purchasing a car.  Fuel efficiency is an 
example of one heuristic for decision-making while the actual mileage that the car 
gets is the value of that heuristic. 
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3. AN EMERGENCY DECISION MAKING MODEL FOR HIGH RISES 
 The research literature reviewed in the preceding section suggests an outline of the 
expedient hazard mitigation decision process for a column failure scenario as shown in Figure 
4. 
 D1, the first decision, concerns the preliminary assessment of whether to risk making 
an emergency assessment of the building.  If not, the building will remain in its unstable 
condition until wind load increases to the point of failure of the entire structure.  This option 
is represented by the line to the left of D1, resulting in uncontrolled failure. If action is taken, 
it will be to place structural engineers close enough to review the situation and make a more 
detailed emergency assessment.  Action leads to the D2 decision for expedient hazard 
mitigation mechanics to attempt to limit the movement of the building in the high wind and/or 
to prepare the building for demolition (i.e., these two options are not mutually exclusive).  The 
key to this decision is that the building could be prepared for demolition at the same time that 
plans are being made to save it.  Preparation for demolition provides an alternative in case the 
building cannot be braced due to excessive movement at the severed members.  The next 
decisions are (1) to determine whether the steel wind frame can be braced or “frozen” in place 
by emergency welding, cabling, or bolting systems (D3 Decision) or saved by reduction of 
wind forces on the structure (D5 Decision) and (2) to estimate whether the completed repairs 
will ensure the building can survive any approaching windstorm.  In addition to the decision-
making for emergency assessment and hazard mitigation (taking action on the building 
structure) in Figure 6 is a group of population protection (evacuation) decision. 
 The emergency assessment and hazard mitigation decisions, together with the ability 
of the chosen constructors, will largely determine the failure or success if an uncontrollable 
event occurs, storm impact.  If the D5 decision is made for controlled failure, the event might 
be turned over to the military, which could have major liability advantages.  Alternately, D5 
could be made for partial demolition by tools in which window walls are demolished on the 
upper floors to reduce the wind cross-section and increase the building’s chance of survival. 
The D5 and/or D6 decision is for permanent structural repairs or removal.  The D4 decision is 
the ultimate repair, mitigation and   decision for a building that has survived.
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 Ultimately, all identified responses (or no response) in the face of an approaching storm 
lead to one of the following outcomes for the building:  repair, demolition, controlled collapse, 
uncontrolled collapse, or survival without intervention.  Clearly, the one result that should be 
identified by the decision-makers and avoided is uncontrolled collapse.  Certainly in theory 
and likely in reality, an uncontrolled high-rise domino collapse could place a long line of 
buildings at risk.  If the direction of the possible collapse is uncertain, an entire downtown 
could require evacuation.  Yet, the stricken building and its contents may be worth in excess 
of a billion dollars.  In current practice, the engineers would be in the employ of the damaged 
building’s owner, who is unlikely to agree to a controlled collapse without considerable 
pressure from the other stakeholders in the situation.   Figure 6 identifies stakeholders such as 
the building owner and his insurance company, the fire department, incident commander, city 
code officials and the mayor who are all sources of input for the major decisions.  (See scenario 
in Appendix). The police and FBI would certainly be represented and working to preserve 
evidence at the crime scene.  The insurers for the engineering (or constructor) firms, as well as 
the steel fabricator and construction team, might also impact the decision makers.  Other 
parties, such as FEMA, are not included in this network because they are likely to take longer 
to mobilize. 
 A summary outline of Figure 4 based on elements of emergency response is as follows: 
1. Emergency Assessment Decision (D1) and Actions 
 Identify actions to quickly evaluate the condition of the building. 
 Identify actions to determine reasonable population protection. 
 Identify actions to determine working personnel protection. 
 Identify stakeholders’ organizations and their senior decision makers. 
 Make D1 Decision; Action/No Action. 
 Identify available engineering/construction assistance. 
2. Hazard Operations Decision (D2) and Actions 
 Identify expedient measures to stabilize the structure. 
 Estimate long term repair as impacting expedient measures. 
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 Identify relevant issues specific to the building. 
 Identify engineering, construction skills and material resources. 
 Make D2 Decision for Temporary Mitigation with D3 or D5 follow up. 
From this outline a normative model of a decision flow chart for expedient hazard 
mitigation follows. 
3. Population Protection – D2 Secondary Decision 
 Recommendations to incident commander. 
i. Evacuation radius. 
ii. Work rules in building (hazard exposure control). 
4. Incident Management – Overview 
The management of the incident may be driven in the early stages (3 hours) by certain 
individuals who are the first to grasp the nature of the risk.  If no engineering or 
construction personnel initiate immediate expedient mitigation measures, then it is 
unlikely that the measures will be undertaken in a time critical manner. This failure to 
act could lead to loss of property and life again, as it did at 9/11 with the loss of WTC 
7 and police and fire personnel in WTC 1 and 2. 
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4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 Although the study is discussed in terms of four immediate objectives, the ultimate goal 
of this study is to learn from a set of experts how participants in an actual crisis are likely to 
respond to situations outside the normal boundaries of engineering decision-making.  
Specifically, the knowledge gained from this study will support the design of effective repair 
response teams for specific risks.  It will also provide a detailed and time efficient model of 
the decision-making process that an Incident Commander and engineer could use in an actual 
event.  The study may also identify future engineering studies and/or computer programs 
needed to support such an action. 
 
4.1       Identify Expedient Mitigation Actions 
 This objective involves identifying the number and type of expedient mitigation actions 
that participants generate.  It is assumed the first group of actions is the emergency assessment 
to investigate the damage and acquire basic information about the building.  The second group 
of actions is the set of repair operations options developed by the participants from the initial 
investigation. 
 
4.2       Test the Proposed Model 
 The first element of this objective is to test the proposed decision flow chart described 
in Section 3.0 and Figure 4 by using subject matter experts in the field working a failed column 
scenario.  Such a test will identify what actions the participants list as emergency assessment, 
hazard operations, population protection and incident management actions.  It can also 
determine if the decision points are approached in the order hypothesized, if experts in a 
dynamic situation work several decisions at the same time, or even if they reverse the order of 
their decisions.  More importantly, do they really identify all the options open to them?  Would 
a more effective model actually begin with certain construction/demolition preparations 
paralleling or even preceding the first engineering decisions? 
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4.3       Research the Effects of Different Professional Expertise 
 The objective here is to explore whether there are areas in which the inclusion of 
experienced construction personnel on engineering teams may improve the overall decision-
making in time-constrained emergencies.  Evidence of such value could be constructors 
accelerating preparations for steel repairs, identifying alternative strategies or recognizing the 
need for specialists that the engineers overlook.  This evaluation does not ask the constructor 
to match the engineer’s knowledge, but only to effectively complement it and provide detail to 
a time pressured problem.  In practice, constructors who think like engineers bring no 
additional value to the analysis.  It is their uniqueness that is of potential value. The proposed 
reference model described earlier in Figure 4 is a traditional approach that assumes engineering 
analysis and planning precede construction mobilization.  If construction personnel see 
different aspects of the problem from the beginning, it could change the proposed model and 
the optimum makeup of the first responder engineering teams.  For instance, constructors might 
be more likely to identify “downstream” implementation actions that require a significant 
amount of preparation time and, thus, are on the critical path for project completion.  Even this 
might not be obvious to engineers in the first hours. 
 
4.4       Research the Effects of Varying Levels of Expertise 
 The first element of this objective requires examining any differences in answers an 
owner or Incident Commander receives from engineers or constructors with varying levels of 
expertise in high-rise construction.  Level of expertise becomes a critical issue in an emergency 
occurring after normal business hours when the most well-trained people may not be 
immediately available.  Should an owner or Incident Commander wait to locate and transport 
one of the small handful of top engineering experts (there are fewer than a dozen in Texas), or 
can the same answers be obtained from less educated or experienced personnel? 
 The second element of objective 4.4 is to understand the value of experience in time-
constrained decision-making, both within the groups and across the entire participant 
population.  Does education narrow or broaden the decision-making focus in a situation 
without precedent?  Does training help avoid the trap of wasting time on non-essential issues?  
And, how do highly educated and executive individuals deal with liability risks to their firm?  
Are they more or less sensitive to liability issues and the work delays implied therein? 
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5. RESEARCH METHODS 
 This study identifies experienced high-rise engineers and constructors and provides 
them with a chronological scenario accompanied by realistic photographs of the damaged 
building.  These study participants were presented a chronological series of open-ended 
questions to evoke responses without suggesting specific answers.  To probe these questions, 
specific inquiries were made on certain subjects. 
 
5.1     Participants 
 A total of 29 subjects participated in this research, fifteen engineers and fourteen 
construction management personnel.  The participants were identified through meetings with 
their firms’ managements.  The engineers’ maximum level of education included three 
Doctoral, ten Master and two Bachelor degrees.  The constructors included one Master, seven 
Bachelor and two Associate degrees and four high school diplomas.  This educational 
difference between the two groups, shown in Table 1, corresponds to differences between the 
two professions, as well as the fact that some senior construction executives are more oriented 
to business than construction and excused themselves from this exercise.  Education was 
divided into four tiers, High School/Associate Degree, Bachelor, Master, and Doctoral degree.  
The actual work experience of the twenty-nine individuals is shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.   Each 
group is divided into four tiers of experience. The number of individuals in 
executive/management positions is indicated in parenthesis in the tables.  
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Table 1 - Maximum Level of Education 
 
  
HS AA BS MS PhD 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
13.3% 
 
 
66.7%(4) 
 
 
20%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
28.6% 
 
 
14.3% 
 
 
50%(3) 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
13.8% 
 
 
6.9% 
 
 
31%(3) 
 
 
38.0%(4) 
 
 
10.3%(1) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
HS – High School 
AA – 2 Yr College 
BS – Bachelors Degree 
MS – Master’s Degree 
PhD – Doctorate 
(  ) Number of Executive/Managers 
Related Figures and Tables: None 
 
Table 2 shows the relation between the profession and the actual total years of 
experience of each individual.  The constructors have a higher average level of experience than 
the engineering personnel.  Some of this difference is attributable to the fewer years of 
education of the average constructor. 
 
Table 2 - Years of Engineering/Construction Experience 
 
  
1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31+ Total 
 
Engineers 
 
13.3% 
 
 
20% 
 
 
26.7%(1) 
 
 
13.3%(1) 
 
 
26.7%(3) 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
0% 
 
 
21.4% 
 
 
28.6%(2) 
 
 
42.9%(1) 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
6.9% 
 
 
20.7% 
 
 
27.6%(3) 
 
 
27.6%(2) 
 
 
17.2%(3) 
 
 
29(8) 
(  ) Number of Executive/Managers 
Related Figures and Tables:  Table 3 
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Table 3 shows the years of specific high rise experience of individuals by profession.  Several 
individuals have fewer years of high rise experience than total engineering or construction 
experience showing in the previous tables.  These individuals have been involved in 
construction of low and mid-rise buildings. 
 
Table 3 - Years of High Rise Experience 
 
  
1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31+ Total 
 
Engineers 
 
20% 
 
 
33.3% 
 
 
13.3%(1) 
 
 
6.7%(1) 
 
 
26.7%(3) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
35.8%(1) 
 
 
28.6%(1) 
 
 
21.4%(1) 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
27.7%(1) 
 
 
31.0%(1) 
 
 
17.2%(2) 
 
 
6.9%(1) 
 
 
17.2%(3) 
 
 
29(8) 
(  ) Number of Executive/Managers 
Related Figures and Tables:  Table 2 
 
5.2       Procedure 
 Table 4 describes the testing sequence, which was conducted between February and 
June, 2010.  Individuals were drawn from three Houston engineering firms and two 
construction firms with extensive high-rise experience.  All individuals had at least some 
experience with high rises and several were regionally or nationally known for their expertise.  
The negotiations with each firm and participant testing lasted approximately one month.   
During the negotiation and testing period, attention was paid to the media and professional 
publications to see if any events occurred that were relevant to any participant’s decision 
making in the exercise.  None was detected. These individuals constituted over 80% of high 
rise engineering expertise in the Houston area and over 50% of general contractor high rise 
experience.  Therefore, although the number of participants is small, they are, in fact, a 
significant proportion of the actual population.  For instance, of the top five high rise engineers 
in Houston by experience, four of them were in this sample. 
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Table 4 - Testing Sequence 
 
Firm # of Participants Testing Period 
Engineering Firm A 6 Feb 2010 
Engineering Firm B 5 March 2010 
Construction Firm A 9 April 2010 
Construction Firm B 5 May 2010 
Engineering Firm C 4 June 2010 
 
 The research exercise was conducted in conference rooms at the engineers’ and 
constructors’ offices on weekdays or Saturdays when participants were working.  Clarification 
questions were encouraged but few were asked and none required adjustment of the 
questionnaire or instructions over the course of the exercise.  In most cases, the exercise was 
run with two participants at a time, but there were five instances where individuals completed 
the exercise alone.  Each participant sat separately and had a complete set of photos and 
documents.  There was no talking between participants and the entire period was monitored.  
The same individual administered all of the exercises.  Elapsed time was given to participants 
at the end of sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and on completion of the exercise.  Participants were told that 
the exercise was not a test of knowledge, but a search for ideas.  Participants were told the 
color of the writing pens would be changed at the ends of sections 1, 2 and 5.  Although the 
subjects were free to revise any answers at any time, the color of the ink indicates when the 
concepts were recorded.  The elapsed time of the exercise varied from about 45 minutes to well 
over two hours (see Appendix D.) 
 The research exercise involved a column failure scenario that is specifically based on 
the decision-making by engineering or construction personnel during a simulated structural 
emergency. The hypothetical building was a 40 story rigid steel frame structure that had 
suffered the severance of a single column on the 21st floor (Figures 6 and 7).  If additional 
columns failed under wind or gravity loading, the entire structure would be at risk of toppling 
as previously illustrated (Figure 2).  Time pressure was generated by a 48 weather forecast of 
a weather front with high winds. 
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Figure 6 - Rigid Frame Structure Prior to Incident.  The hypothetical subject building for the 
study:  The building is forty stories tall of rigid framed steel construction as is typical of 
hundreds of high rise buildings in the U.S.  The exterior wind frame columns are thirty feet on 
center. The removal of a column on the 21st floor results in the exterior wind frame condition 
as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
LOBBY 
5TH FLOOR 
                                                   
 
 
 
GROUND FLOOR ELEV. 0’ 
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Figure 7 - Condition of Hypothetical Building at Beginning of Exercise.  The removal of a 
column on the 21st floor results in the downward sagging of floors 22 through 40 as 
indicated.  The exact condition of the typical beams will vary somewhat from what is shown 
here and will be covered by detailed photos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5TH FLOOR 
                                                   
 
 
GROUND FLOOR ELEV. 0’ 
 
 
 
LOBBY 
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Each subject read a four-page scenario that was interspersed with several pages of questions, 
and the exercise was run in real time except for contraction of travel and movement time.  
Photographs of a three dimensional model of the building were used to exactly illustrate the 
damage with enlarged photographs showing the damage in detail (See Appendix A for 
photographs). The buildings columns were 30 feet on center.  These relatively long spans 
resulted in a large damaged area, as the 60 feet of unsupported beams sagged into the void left 
by the missing column.  The beams formed a shallow V on the face of the building with the 
severed column at the point of the V.  The distortion of the frame twisted and broke the 
windows up the building to the roof and would be visible for miles if not obscured by other 
tall buildings. 
 The load previously carried by the severed column was shifted to adjacent columns on 
either side and seriously increased their loading.  The exterior girders, which also served as the 
horizontal members of the wind frame, were seriously distorted and their loading distribution 
to the columns would have been difficult to estimate, much less accurately calculate.  Welded 
connections at the columns partially failed in tension and threatened further failure in the 15 to 
25 mile per hour wind movement.  Due to the partial failure of the wind frame, the movement 
of the building was exacerbated.  There was no routine means of exactly calculating the 
building’s remaining strength or even the capacity of individual floors. 
 The removal of a small section of column greatly reduced the building’s ability to 
withstand wind loading.  The destruction of twenty floors of rigid framing broke the continuity 
of the structural square tube and substantially lowered the building’s ability to withstand high 
winds.  The damage on the west side of the building would cause substantial torsion in any 
lateral movement of the building. 
 The exercise documents consisted of the photos of the model (Appendix A), the map 
of the immediate area where the building is located (Appendix B), the photos of surrounding 
buildings (Appendix C) and the Engineer’s (or Constructor’s) Questionnaire (Appendix D).  A 
complete structural plan of the building was provided to the participants, but is not included 
here.  The Constructor’s Questionnaire is not included, but was identical to the engineers’ 
except for a few necessary word changes so that the document would apply to construction 
personnel. 
The specific questions asked of participants were in four main areas: 
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1. Concerns about liability risk to the participant or his/her firm (4 questions).  This 
series of four questions began by asking an opinion about the risk of continuing to 
occupy the building.  The willingness to provide engineering opinions in a life or 
death situation is used to judge liability concerns at the beginning of the exercise 
(Table 7).  The second question was prefaced by a discussion with the firm’s CEO, 
who is out of town but recommends that the participant discuss the matter with the 
firm’s legal counsel.  Then the participant was specifically asked what action he 
will take on the recommendation (Table 8). The influence of attorneys is commonly 
suspected to be detrimental to the free flow of professional advice necessary for 
hazard mitigation. So, a few questions later a third evaluation was made (using the 
same judgment criteria as Table 9) as to whether the participant was showing 
concern about the advice he was giving.  This can be compared to the liability 
judgment (Table 10). 
Toward the end of the exercise, after a series of structural risk questions (see #3 
below), the participant was informed that his firm’s insurer had announced that they 
would no longer cover his/her professional judgment. The participant was then 
specifically asked what, if any actions are necessary to continue to give advice 
(Table 16). This was followed by a single question about the use of government 
authority to facilitate hazard mitigation.   This question asked if the participants 
would request government transport or escort for an important individual a hundred 
miles away during traffic congestion.  This question explored whether participants 
understood the additional power that the emergency grants to government 
authorities.  This was an open-ended question and answers were not suggested in 
the question format. 
2. Structural engineering judgments (5 questions).  These questions revolved around 
key safety issues that emergency management personnel would ask.  The questions 
asked for estimates of the wind speed needed to induce structural failure (Table 11), 
the risk of collapse in 24 hours (Table 12), a safe evacuation radius (Table 13), the 
possibility of domino failure (Table 14), and an estimate of time required to analyze 
damage and begin repairs (Table 15). These questions were multiple-choice except 
the last, which was open-ended. 
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3. Methods for initiating the event (2 questions). These two multiple choice questions 
were added for background information concerning the participant’s knowledge of 
steel buildings’ vulnerabilities.  The first question asked for an estimate of the size 
of parcel containing the device that inflicted the damage (Table 17).  The second 
question asked the participant to estimate the time it would take to prepare the 
device and install it in the building (Table 18). 
 The continental United States averages several windstorms a month with winds 
exceeding 60 mph and freak gusts occur often in Central Business Districts.  Participants were 
told that a windstorm was expected 48 hours from the initial review of the damage.  This 
information was expected to force decisions and reduce the opportunity for procrastination, as 
it would in an actual event.  
 
5.3       Statistical Analysis 
 Because this study is using the majority of engineering and construction experts in the 
city of Houston, conventional statistical inference techniques are not appropriate.  
Consequently, differences in means or percentages will be discussed in terms of their 
theoretical and practical significance.  For the geographical location where this study was 
made, we must recognize, of course, that these differences may change as this small population 
evolves over time due to retirement and or relocation.  If our sample were assumed to be 
representing a larger population then 30% variation would be a meaningful difference.  Due to 
the majority of the small population being included in the study, the small differences shown 
in the tables here may be more significant than they would be if this sample were representing 
a much larger population.   
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6. RESULTS 
 The participants first generated a list of emergency assessment actions. This was 
followed by a list of immediate repair options to mitigate the danger of collapse from a 
windstorm. In addition, participants were asked to indicate whether the building could be 
returned to service (“yes” or “no”). From these three self-generated lists, the participants made 
decisions for implementation of a single strategy for expedient hazard migration. 
 The participants thus generated four lists with the following totals: 
1. A list of 12 immediate emergency assessment and incident management actions. 
2. A list of 12 options for hazard operations (expedient hazard mitigation) actions. 
3. A list of opinions as to the long-term use of the building “yes-no”. 
4. A list of eight final strategies defined by the participants’ combination of expedient 
mitigation and long-term disposition of the building after the storm (e.g. brace before 
the storm and demolition of structure afterward.) 
In addition, a series of multiple choice and open-ended questions furnished some insight 
into the participant’s professional opinions on legal, management and structural issues that 
probably influence the selection of an expedient mitigation strategy. 
 
6.1    Outline of Participants Strategies 1-8 and Order Presented 
 The participants collectively generated eight expedient hazard mitigation strategies, all 
of which followed the decision patterns D1 through D6 proposed in Figure 4.  Those eight 
strategies are graphically detailed and discussed in Section 6.6. 
The decision strategies had two phases.  First, there were decisions related to mitigating 
the immediate danger (within 48 hours) of the building collapsing; second, there were decisions 
as to whether the building could later be repaired and eventually returned to use.   
Decisions D1, D2 and D3 related to immediate (48 hour) repair options, D4 and D5 
related to immediate demolition (48 hour) options, and D6 related to permanent repair or long-
term demolition (dismantling).  Some options in D4 and D5, such as implosion, would also, of 
course, be permanent in nature.  Otherwise, immediate options were temporary in nature, 
designed to stabilize the structure until a permanent resolution for the future of the building 
could be determined at D6. 
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The eight ultimate strategies contained only five major variations for immediate 
mitigation.  Those five initial strategies were: 
1. Weld or bolt the two segments of the severed column together to carry some 
of the load and prevent further deterioration. (Options 1 and 2). 
2. Reduce the overload on adjacent columns by shoring the floors or bracing 
the adjacent columns or otherwise transferring loading around the damaged 
column. (Options 3 and 4).  
3. Partial demolition of upper floors to reduce wind resistance at the point of 
maximum overturning moment by removing exterior glass and interior walls 
(Option 5). 
4. Take no immediate action to protect the building.  Participants either believe 
the building is too dangerous to work on or conversely, that it can survive 
without action. (Options 5, 6 and 7) 
5. Immediate demolition by military or civilian explosive experts (Option 8). 
The eight ultimate strategies contained the long-term mitigation options of either 
systematic demolition or repair and return to service.  These long-term decisions would, in 
turn, impact the immediate mitigation decision. 
The remaining variation in the strategies concerned whether or not the building could 
be permanently repaired.  The immediate options 1, 2 and 4 above have multiple proponents 
who disagreed on the validity of the long-term repairs to save the building.  This disagreement 
resulted in those three options having double results raising the total number of strategies to 
eight. 
The decision flow charts for each of the eight strategies are included in Section 6.5.  As 
discussed above, each strategy consisted of an immediate mitigation option (48 hours) and a 
permanent strategy.  In the case of implosion, the immediate and permanent options were the 
same. 
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6.2       Strategies by Profession, Education and Experience 
6.2.1    Researching the Effects of Different Expertise: Strategy Results by Profession  
The strategies generated in the exercise were remarkably similar across profession.  
Table 5A below shows initial emergency operation strategies by profession.  The long-term 
options that complete the strategy will be addressed later. 
 
Table 5A – Percentage of Participants by Profession Using Each Expedient Hazard 
Mitigation Strategy 
 
   
Engineers 
 
Constructors 
 
Total 
Initial Strategies 1 & 2 Repair 53% 36% 13 
Initial Strategies 3 & 4 Repair 20% 21% 6 
Initial Strategies 5 Repair 7% 0% 1 
Initial Strategies 6 & 7 No Action 20% 29% 7 
Initial Strategy 8 Demolition 0% 14% 2 
Total 15 14 29 
 
 Strategies 1 through 5 are temporary repair strategies while 6 through 8 are non-repair 
strategies. The most popular strategy was 1 and 2, which was twice as popular as either 3 and 
4 or 6 and 7.  Strategies 5 and 8 had very few proponents. 
 Strategies 1 and 2 included the repair (rejoining) of the severed column.  Engineers 
were generally optimistic about repair and their confidence resulted in a gap between 
professions in Strategies 1 and 2.  The primary differences between professions were on 
strategies 1, 2, 8 and to a lesser extent, 5.   
 Strategy 8 was implosion of the building.  Only constructors proposed it, possibly 
because they have a closer working relation to the demolition business. Also, engineers might 
have been more optimistic about the success of interventions in increasing the building’s 
chances of survival.   
Strategy 5 is the removal of glass and walls to allow wind to pass through the building.  
The only participant to choose this solution was also the most highly educated and most senior 
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executive participant in the exercise.  This is a near foolproof way to reduce the overturning 
moment on the building.  Three constructors considered the idea, but did not ultimately use it. 
 In Strategies 1 through 4, the answers from engineers reflected greater understanding 
of the overall role played by the wind frame.  Whereas constructors were very concerned about 
the column repair or substitute support, the engineers addressed the overall exterior frame that 
resists the wind loading.  An example of this difference in focus was constructors shoring up 
the floor while engineers shored the wind beam (which resisted wind loading) at the critical 
location.  The engineer’s strategy hopefully not only worked to assist the gravity loading 
issues, but also the wind loading in the rigid frame. Nonetheless, the constructors often showed 
an acute concern for the time element and the practicality of construction. 
 The primary difference between professions was that engineers preferred repairs (80% 
of answers) more often than constructors (57%).  This difference can be attributed to 
engineering education providing a more complete vision of the remaining strength of the 
structure and an understanding of the specific repairs necessary to recover strength in the wind 
frame. 
 The overall results indicate that constructors and engineers were generally similar in 
their strategies in that both groups emphasized Strategies 1 – 4 and 6/7 rather than 5 or 8.  
Nonetheless, they did differ somewhat in their focus on the strategies, with the engineers 
perhaps underemphasizing practicality of construction and related time issues, while the 
constructors tended to overlook wind frame issues.  Possible implications will be discussed in 
Section 7. 
 
6.2.2    Strategies by Level of Expertise (Education) 
 The aggressive approach to repairs held true within the engineering participants as 
shown in Table 5B where 77% of graduate-level participants favored temporary repair action 
(Strategies 6/7) and none favored immediate demolition (Strategy 8). 
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Table 5B – Percentage of Engineers Identifying Each Strategy by Education 
 
  
BS 
 
MS/PhD 
 
Total 
Repair Initial Strategy 1-5 100% 77% 12 
Non-Repair Initial Strategy  6-8 0% 23% 3 
Total 2 13 15 
 
 
Table 5C – Percentage of Constructors Identifying Each Strategy by Education 
 
  
HS/AA 
 
BS/MS/PhD 
 
Total 
Repair Initial Strategy 1-5 50% 62% 8 
Non-Repair Initial Strategy  6-8 50% 38% 6 
Total 6 8 14 
 
Among constructor participants, there was a greater uncertainty about the building 
surviving the storm.  That resulted in 43% (29% + 14% Table 5A) of constructors choosing to 
take no action or to implode the building.  Table 5C shows that the less educated were more 
likely to choose this route.  While the percentage is small, it is consistent with the previously 
discussed concept of education contributing to optimism for repairs. 
 
6.3    Initial Action Options by Participants 
Following the initial event of a building manager calling the participant’s office for 
assistance on a Sunday afternoon, participants responded to three questions.  First, how would 
the participant respond to the manager on the phone; second, what actions would he take after 
hanging up; and third, what instructions would he give to other members of his firm that could 
be contacted by phone.  The questions were open-ended with no hints for action except the 
building manager’s request to come to the site.  This part of the scenario reflects the normal 
manner for a building manager to request engineering assistance. Answers such as obtaining 
personal safety gear and calling spouses were deleted.                                       
The remaining answers that were relevant to mitigation were compiled in the following 
list, which is presented in the general chronological order that the participants listed them.  This 
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order was to some extent determined by the sequence of questions, but it is a logical chronology 
for an actual event.  The constructors had a slightly higher mean number of actions (6.28) than 
did the engineers (5.33). 
Figure 8 following the list shows the frequency with which each of the assessments was 
mentioned. The initial actions for expedient hazard mitigation are as follows: 
A1. As indicated in Figure 8, all participants listed a site visit.  This action is necessary 
as soon as possible for several reasons.   First, the client has requested support on 
site.  In a crisis there is psychological value to the physical presence of a 
knowledgeable engineer or constructor.  Second, the emergency managers and the 
building manager are going to have a series of questions, some of which are listed in 
the next section (Section 6.4).    In particular, the critical question is whether the 
building could collapse suddenly.  An expert’s presence on site is necessary to 
evaluate that urgent question.  Third, initiating several lines of investigation into the 
condition of the building can only be done on site. The director of the operation must 
evaluate where it is safe to send technicians, surveyors, welders, and laborers.  Fourth, 
legal and law enforcement issues are going to develop very quickly as law 
enforcement and the intelligence community exert investigative control over the site.  
It must be recognized that that the FBI will try to isolate the area of the most intense 
damage for crime scene  
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Figure 8 - Histogram of Emergency Assessment and Incident Management Actions for 
Expedient Hazard Management: Percentage of Participants Who Identified Each Action 
Related Figures and Tables:  Table 6 
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investigation even though this is also the area where the majority of engineers and 
constructors say they would concentrate their repair efforts. 
A2. Most participants (59%) listed a document search for the building’s structural plans, 
specifications, and if possible, the original structural calculations; all of these would 
help to assess the building’s stability.  In the exercise, the building manager had a 
structural set but no calculations were available.  This unavailability would be typical 
in a real event. 
A3. An overwhelming majority (90%) of participants listed notification of their 
company’s executives, which is a key step in smoothly taking control of the project.   
Support personnel should be charged with locating and informing the executives 
related to this type of project as soon as possible.  Executives not only bring broad 
expertise beyond engineering to the problem, but also can cause disruption to a plan 
of action if they suddenly inject themselves at a later time. 
A4. Most participants (86%) also mentioned assembling top staff, which is necessary to 
handle the myriad facets of the problem that will arise in a matter of hours.  Figure 6 
(p. 31) identified the stakeholders in the problem and their interrelationships. Failure 
to anticipate these relationships from the outset can seriously interrupt a mitigation 
plan.  A separate office team to handle calculations and structural planning and 
drawings would also be advisable.  
A5. Only a minority (34%) mentioned early notification of steel constructors, which was 
a move to reduce the time required to implement mitigation actions.  The constructors 
could move welders and their bulky equipment into place during the many hours that 
the engineers and constructors were making decisions D1, D2, and D3.  If a radical 
situation finally rules out repair mitigation, the cost of a few hours of unutilized 
mobilization is minor.  If the planner negotiated the mobilization request correctly, 
there might be no cost at all if the work was not performed. 
A6. Very few participants (10%) listed the immediate notification of a surveyor, but it 
would have been critical in order to understand the condition of the building.  If the 
building was out of vertical alignment, it could bring the P-Delta lever discussed 
earlier into being.  This effect could result in heavier loading on the critical columns 
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adjacent to the severed column.  A surveyor would also be essential in determining 
the amount of wind movement due to the damage.    
A7. A minority (28%) of respondents identified a review of legal issues, which primarily 
revolved around liability concerns in case of damage, injury or death while the 
consultant was in charge.  Of particular concern was the possibility of further collapse 
involving workers. 
A8. A minority (14%) of participants listed owner authorization, which involved a clear 
understanding of what is being requested by the owner’s representative and insuring 
he really had the authority to make commitments on the owner’s behalf.  The initial 
consulting would almost certainly take place on verbal authority.  This was something 
to be passed to an executive or attorney while the consulting continued. 
A9. A small minority (7%) of respondents identified police and FBI contact.  This was a 
concern because of the history of law enforcement agencies demanding and getting 
control of crime scenes to the detriment of other stakeholders.  In this case, the 
urgency of the emergency repair mitigation would have to be impressed on law 
enforcement.  An excellent argument is that the existing crime scene would vanish if 
the building collapses. 
A10. A substantial majority (76%) of participants listed team organization, which refers to 
the overall mitigation team consisting of engineers, constructors, owner’s 
representatives, and various specialists such as surveyors.   In a time critical incident, 
this organization would take place in a site meeting in which “roles and goals” are 
explained to the teams before entering the building to commence work.  At this time, 
the engineers would need to have basic sketches prepared or personally direct the 
work.  Such a meeting might be possible in 12 to 24 hours with efficient organization 
and even less with preplanning. 
A11. A minority (14%) of respondents mentioned determining floor loading.  This would 
evaluate whether falling wreckage has overloaded floors below, thereby risking 
localized collapses that could endanger workers below or even the stability of the 
building. If this were determined to be a risk, the debris would have to be reduced or 
the areas below evacuated.  A slightly different version of this action also appears in 
the list of mitigation options in Section 6.5, mitigation option 9. 
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A12. A slight majority (62%) listed damage assessment and monitoring steel which refers 
to an engineering evaluation of the individual points of damage and any creeping 
expansion of that damage.  Expansion of damage by wind movement of the building 
was of particular concern to participants.  Monitoring the steel referred to personally 
watching or remotely monitoring any cracked beams, the severed column and to 
detect any further expansion of cracks or deterioration of the situation.   A surveyor’s 
findings of building verticality and alignment would also be essential to this report.   
This report would be the foundation for the selection of hazard mitigation options to 
form the ultimate strategy such as those shown in Section 6.6.  
The initial response action shown in Table 6 was listed by each participant.  These 12 
actions are believed to be important and unique to the engineering decision maker, thus not 
duplicated by other stakeholders identified in Figure 6.  None of the engineers or constructors 
identified all of the initial actions that were identified by the group as a whole.  Instead, the 
largest number of initial response actions was nine, which was listed by one of the constructors.  
The smallest number of initial actions, three, was listed by one engineer and one constructor.  
On average, the constructors listed slightly more initial actions (6.28) than did the engineers 
(5.33).  Moreover, of the 180 opportunities for mentioning initial actions (12 initial actions x 
15 engineers) for the engineering participants, only 80 (44%) were identified.  Similarly, of 
the 168 opportunities (12 x 14) for the 14 construction participants, only 88 (52%) were 
identified. 
The differences between engineers and constructors with respect to the number of 
initial actions mentioned can also be seen, to a limited extent, in differences between these two 
groups with respect to three of the initial actions.  Using 30 percentage points as an indication 
of a meaningful difference, Table 6 shows that there were differences between professions for 
conducting a document search, notifying a steel contractor, and reviewing floor loadings.  The 
engineers showed significantly more concern with locating documents (30% difference), 
which is reasonable as their work is normally focused on this activity.  The constructors, 
meanwhile, focused on notifying their key subcontractors, the steel contractors (30% 
difference).  The constructors also focused on a key safety issue that they are normally 
responsible for, the permissible floor loading of their work area (29% difference). 
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There were a few activities that were associated with education. Document search shows a 
significant correlation with increased education (which also correlates with the engineers 
being more highly educated).  However, higher education is weakly related to a decreased 
tendency to notify executives.  Finally, with respect to experience, there are no meaningful 
correlations other than an association of increased experience with a greater likelihood of 
requesting an immediate damage assessment. 
 
Table 6 - Percentage of Participants Taking Initial Emergency Assessment and Incident 
Management Actions 
 
 
Related Figures and Tables: Figure 8 
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6.4       Responses to Specific Questions 
Tables 7-18 are numbered in the chronological order in which questions occurred in 
the exercise.  By observing the numbers of the tables, the reader can sense each question’s 
context.  For instance, the liability question asked in Table 16 was preceded by a series of high-
risk structural questions (Tables 11–15) that could clearly lead to loss of life if the participant 
made an error in his/her judgment. 
Table 7 shows how participants say they would respond to concerns about personal and 
firm liability when advising the owner or authorities on risk issues. All of the engineers and all 
but one of the constructors show no concern about liability.  The difference between engineers 
and constructors is not meaningful. 
 
Table 7 - Participants Initial Liability Concern 
 
 
 
No 
Concern 
or 
Delay 
Delay in 
High-
Risk 
Decisions 
Delays 
Until 
Release 
Promised 
Delays 
Until 
Released 
Signed 
All 
Decisions 
Deferred 
to Others 
 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 100% (5) 0% 0% 0% 0% 15(5) 
 
Constructors 92.9%(3) 7.1% 0% 0% 0% 14(3) 
 
Total 96.5%(8) 3.5% 0% 0% 0% 20(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures and Tables:  Tables 8 and 10 
 
Table 8 reflects the participant’s reaction to a suggestion to seek legal advice concerning both 
their firm’s and their own liability risk in trying to assist the building owner.  This question 
was designed to provide a follow-up probe to the question about liability concerns described 
in Table 7.  As Table 8 indicates, only a minority of either group refused to call a lawyer, but 
only one respondent would follow a lawyer’s direction or defer to a lawyer or the CEO.  
Instead, a majority of constructors and a substantial majority of engineers would give 
direction to a lawyer.  Differences between engineers and constructors are minor. 
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Table 8 - Participants Reaction to Suggestion to Talk to Lawyer 
 
  Does Not 
Call 
Lawyer 
Delays 
Calling 
Lawyer 
Gives 
Lawyer 
Direction 
Follows 
Lawyer’s 
Direction 
Defers to 
CEO or 
Lawyer 
 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 20%(2) 6.7%(1) 73%(2) 0% 0% 15(5) 
 
Constructors 28.6%(1) 7.1%(1) 57.1% 7.1%(1) 0% 14(3) 
 
Total 24.1%(3) 6.9%(2) 65.5%(2) 3.4%(1) 0% 29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 7, 8 and 10 
 
 
Table 9 explores the awareness and willingness of the participants to request assistance 
from government authority to resolve specific problems. In general, the participants expressed 
little need for government assistance of any kind.  Although the constructors were about 30 
percentage points more likely to request some kind of assistance, there was no consistently 
significant pattern for a single type of action. 
  
Table 9 - Participants Willingness to Invoke Government Authority 
 
 
 
 No 
Requests 
Police 
Escort 
Air 
Transport 
Military 
Assistance 
Mixed 
Requests(1) 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 86.7%(5) 13.3% 0% 0% 0% 15(5) 
 
Constructors 57.1%(3) 7.1% 21.4% 7.1% 7.1% 14(3) 
 
Total 72.4%(8) 10.3% 10.3% 3.4% 3.4% 29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
(1) “Mixed requests” refer to at least two of the previous categories.  
Related Figures & Tables:  None 
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Table 10 categorizes participants’ responses to the executive’s recommendation that 
they seek a lawyer’s advice.  None of the engineers expressed any concern about how this 
recommendation would affect their actions.  Three of the constructors would limit their advice 
to some extent, but the rest were as unconcerned as the engineers. 
 
Table 10 - Participants Legal Concern after Executive Recommends Lawyer 
 
 
 
No 
Concern 
or Delay 
Delay in 
High-Risk 
Decisions 
Delays 
Until 
Release 
Promised 
Delays 
Until 
Released 
Signed 
All 
Decisions 
Deferred 
to Others 
 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 
 
100%(5) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
78.6%(3) 
 
 
21.4% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
89.7%(8) 
 
 
10.3% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 7 and 8 are the antecedent of this question 
 
 
Table 11 shows participants’ responses to a question asking them to estimate the wind 
speed at which the building would experience total failure in its weakened condition. The 
answers covered the full range of the alternatives from 40 to 80 mph.  Some of this range of 
answers is attributable to participants’ varying opinions about the progressive nature of 
cracking of welds in the wind girder connected to the damaged column as the building moved 
in the wind. Several engineers indicated that there was no precedent for rapidly analyzing the 
problem, but proposed procedures to estimate the building’s strength and, thus provided higher 
estimates of the wind speed required to induce structural failure. The exercise postulated a 60 
mph windstorm predicted in 48 hours. 
The engineers’ mean estimate of the wind speed needed to induce failure was 51.3 mph 
and their median judgment was < 40 mph. The constructors’ mean judgment was 46.4 mph 
and their median judgment was <40 mph.  These averages are both well below the predicted 
wind storm speed (60 mph). The majority of participants (80% of engineers and 93% of 
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constructors) estimated structural failure at < 60 mph.  There were no meaningful differences 
between the engineers and constructors.  The slightly greater confidence by engineers in the 
structures is consistent with Table 5A where constructors were quicker to give up on repairs. 
 
Table 11 - Participants’ Estimates of the Wind Speed Required to Induce Structural Failure 
 
  <40 50 60 70 >80 Total 
 
Engineers 
 
53.3%(2) 
 
 
13.3% 
 
 
13.3%(1) 
 
 
6.7%(1) 
 
 
13.3%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
64.3%(2) 
 
 
21.4% 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
7.1%(1) 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
58.6%(4) 
 
 
17.2% 
 
 
10.3%(1) 
 
 
3.4%(1) 
 
 
10.3%(2) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures and Tables: Table 12 
 
Table 12 shows that participants’ estimates of the risk of collapse within 24 hours 
provided a wide range of answers. In both groups, the most common estimate was 25%, but, 
on average, engineers made somewhat lower estimates of the chance of collapse with a mean 
of 22% compared to the 30.4% for constructors.  These data are consistent with Table 11 
indicating engineers have greater faith in the integrity of the structure. Only 65% of 
constructors place 24-hour structural failure at 25% or less, while 87% of engineers do.  In the 
same vein, twice as many engineers as constructors (4 vs. 2) believe the chance of collapse to 
be 0%.  
An interesting aside is that no participants believed the chance of collapse to exceed 
50% even though the site was experiencing low winds at the time of the analysis.  This would 
suggest that no participant believes the building will collapse without major additional stress 
being induced. 
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Table 12 - Participants’ Estimates of the Risk of Collapse within 24 Hours 
 
  0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Total 
 
Engineers 
 
26.7%(3) 
 
 
60%(2) 
 
 
13.3% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
14.3%(1) 
 
 
50%(2) 
 
 
35.7% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
20.7%(4) 
 
 
55.2%(4) 
 
 
24.1% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 13 and 14 
 
 
Table 13 lists responses from a question asking for a recommended protective action 
distance.  Engineers recommended evacuating an average radius of 2.3 blocks (21.6 square 
blocks) with a standard deviation of 1.2, whereas constructors recommended an average of 3.4 
blocks (46.2 square blocks) with a higher standard deviation of 1.7.  Thus, constructors would 
evacuate more than twice the area, implying a doubling of the cost of the evacuation.  Again, 
these results are consistent with a greater optimism on the part of engineers as to the building’s 
stability and somewhat less concern about a domino failure.   
 
Table 13 - Participants’ Estimates of Safe Evacuation Radius 
 
  
1 
Block 
2 
Blocks 
3 
Blocks 
4 
Blocks 
5 + 
Blocks 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 
 
33.3%(3) 
 
 
26.7% 
 
 
26.7%(1) 
 
 
6.7% 
 
 
6.7%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
14.3%(1) 
 
 
21.4%(1) 
 
 
14.3% 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
42.9%(1) 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
24.1%(4) 
 
 
24.1%(1) 
 
 
20.7%(1) 
 
 
6.9% 
 
 
24.1%(2) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 12 and 14 
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Table 14 lists participants’ estimates for the risk of the building toppling and 
impacting adjacent buildings in such a manner that they also collapse (domino failure).  Only 
a small minority (17.2%) of participants rejected the possibility of a domino failure, but the 
estimates covered the entire range of probabilities all the way up to 100%. Nonetheless, the 
most common response for both groups was 25%, indicating that domino failure was 
believed possible, but not likely.  Although engineers were again more optimistic as a group, 
the differences between groups were consistent, but not significant. 
 
Table 14 - Participants’ Estimates of the Possibility of Domino Failure 
 
  0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Total 
 
Engineers 
 
20%(3) 
 
 
53.3%(2) 
 
 
20% 
 
 
6.7% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
14.3%(1) 
 
 
50%(2) 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
14.3% 
 
 
14.3% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
17.2%(4) 
 
 
51.7%(4) 
 
 
13.8% 
 
 
10.3% 
 
 
6.9% 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 12 and 13 
 
 
Table 15 shows participant’s responses to a question as to the number of days required 
for a “proper” analysis before temporary repairs.  While there is no significant variation 
between professions, the answers cover the entire range of the options provided.  For both 
groups, the most common response is one day (the low end of the scale), but the next most 
common response is five or more days (the high end of the scale). 
This extreme variation in the estimate of time analysis within the groups partly resulted 
from different concepts of an emergency work day (8 or 24 hours?), the extent of shortcuts that 
can be taken in an emergency (verbal instructions as opposed to fully designed drawings), the 
rapidity of cost approvals in an emergency (minutes as opposed to days), and the time savings 
that multiple teams can accomplish.  Some participants seemed to grasp these accelerated 
procedures more quickly than others. 
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Table 15 - Participant’s Estimate of Time Required to Analyze Damage and Begin Repairs 
 
  
1 
Day 
2 
Days 
3 
Days 
4 
Days 
5 + 
Days 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 
 
40%(2) 
 
 
13.3%(2) 
 
 
13.3% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
33.3%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
50%(3) 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
14.3%(1) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
28.6% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
44.8%(5) 
 
 
10.3%(2) 
 
 
13.8%(1) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
31%(1) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  None 
 
 
Table 16 lists participant’s opinions as to the degree of interruption that would be 
caused if the participant’s employer was notified that their liability policy did not cover 
emergency consulting.  This table implies a greatly increased level of concern for liability as 
compared to Tables 7, 8 and 10. 
The key issue that this table introduces is the possibility that the repair effort will be 
shut down for a lack of professional advice if professional liability insurance is withdrawn.  
Almost all (93%) of the engineers and 79% of constructors effectively stopped advising until 
a liability release was at least promised.  Only one engineer indicated he would continue as a 
sense of public duty with some concern indicated.  Three constructors took a similar stance. 
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Table 16 - Risk of Delay Caused by Liability Issues 
 
  
No 
Concern 
or Delay 
Delay in 
High Risk 
Decisions 
Delays 
Until 
Release 
Promised 
Delays 
Until 
Release 
Signed 
All 
Decisions 
Deferred 
to Others Total 
 
Engineers 
 
0% 
 
 
6.7%(1) 
 
 
6.7% 
 
 
46.7%(3) 
 
 
40%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
21.4% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14.3%(1) 
 
 
28.6%(2) 
 
 
35.7% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
10.3% 
 
 
3.4% (1) 
 
 
10.3%(1) 
 
 
37.9%(5) 
 
 
37.9%(1) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Tables 7, 8 and 10 
 
 
Table 17 explored the participant’s understanding of the size of the device that could 
have produced this magnitude of impact on a steel framed building.  The responses ranged 
from the size of a purse to the size of a small suitcase with the engineers consistently providing 
larger estimates of the device’s size.  The most common engineer’s was a small briefcase while 
constructors’ was a purse. 
 
Table 17 - Size of Device for Action 
 
  
Purse 
Small 
Briefcase 
Large 
Briefcase 
Small 
Suitcase 
Large 
Suitcase 
 
Total 
 
Engineers 
 
20%(2) 
 
 
46.7%(1) 
 
20% 
 
 
13.3%(2) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
64.3%(3) 
 
 
28.6% 
 
 
7.1% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
41.4%(5) 
 
 
37.9%(1) 
 
 
13.8% 
 
 
6.9%(2) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables:  Table 18 
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Table 18 related to the participant’s understanding of the time necessary for a trained 
technician to prepare a structural member for demolition.  Most participants (76%) predicted 
the time to be an hour or less.  As was the case in Table 17, the engineer’s estimate of time 
required (the most common response was one hour), was significantly more than the 
constructors (the most common was one half-hour).  However, there was significant 
dissension among the participants with estimates varying by a factor of four from ½ hour to 2 
hours and one engineer estimating 8 hours of preparation time. 
 
Table 18 - Time Required to Prepare for Action 
 
  ½ Hour 1 Hour 2 Hours 4 Hours 8 Hours Total 
 
Engineers 
 
26.7%(1) 
 
 
46.7%(2) 
 
 
20%(1) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
6.7%(1) 
 
 
15(5) 
 
Constructors 
 
57.1%(2) 
 
 
21.4%(1) 
 
 
21.4% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
14(3) 
 
Total 
 
41.4%(3) 
 
 
34.5%(3) 
 
 
20.7%(1) 
 
 
0% 
 
 
3.4%(1) 
 
 
29(8) 
 
( ) Number of Executives/Managers  
Related Figures & Tables: Table 17 
 
6.5       Hazard Mitigation Options by Participants 
 The second category of information furnished by the participants is a list of mitigation 
options for emergency operations.  These are the engineering strategies that the participants 
themselves developed while working the exercise.  These solutions were developed 
independently by each subject. No repair options were either implicitly or explicitly suggested 
during the exercise.  The results show that none of the solutions were outside the normative 
model diagram although several fell under "other solutions", "partial demolition", or "no 
action." If we look at the first five options, engineers only identified 51% and constructors only 
40%.  The remaining seven options had even lower percentages. 
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Options 1 through 5 were the primary solutions for saving the building that were 
generally identified. The other solutions may or may not be practical and effective. Option 11 
was both practical and effective, but does not save the building. 
The results not only include the options discussed in Section 6.1, but also other 
alternatives that participants chose not to use for various reasons.  Participants discarded some 
strategies because they would take too much time to implement and discarded others because 
they were simply less effective solutions to the problem.  There could also be cases where the 
discarded strategy was not fully thought out and thus, its suitability was underestimated. 
 
6.5.1    An Engineering Description of the Participant List 
 Figure 9 shows the frequency with which each of the mitigation options was mentioned.  
The initial actions for expedient mitigation for hazard operations are as follows: 
O1. Reconnect the two severed sections of the damaged column to reduce further 
movement in the wind and transfer any additional load from the upper floors back 
into the column line.  Welding was the most popular approach, with 59% of the 
participants mentioning it. 
O2. Brace the frame to regain the lost stiffness in the external wind frame.  This is a 
separate problem from gravity loading and could be accomplished by cabling or 
welding or bolting braces. This is the third most popular response with 48% of 
the participants mentioning it.  As Table 19 indicates, engineers were much more 
likely than constructors to mention this option. 
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Figure 9 - Histogram of Options for Expedient Hazard Mitigation. This graph shows the 
percentage of both engineers and constructors who suggested each option. The first five 
options are more conventional and relatively straight forward in execution.  The last seven are 
more unusual and may be difficult to execute. 
Related Graphs and Tables:  Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
 
Table 19 - Percentage of Participants Identifying Options for Expedient Hazard Mitigation 
 
 
This table shows the relationship of experts by education and experience to the 
identification of repair options open to them at D3 and D5.  The percent of participants listing 
each option are shown.   The first five options make up the majority that participants mention 
and form the core of eventual strategy solutions.  There appears to be a tendency for the 
individuals with the greatest education and experience to less frequently identify Options 6 – 
12.  In addition, the table indicates that greater expertise in education and experience leads to 
the more frequent use of Options 1 – 5 and Option 9.  These options represent more 
conventional approaches to the problem.  It is also indicated that the radical solution of 
implosion is inversely related to education and experience.  Also, of the six unusual or radical 
solutions (O6, O7, O8, O10, O11, and O12) only one individual of the most highly educated 
and experienced groups, subscribed to any of these solutions.  This represents a subscription 
rate of less than 2% among the top experts. (O9 is not considered to be a radical alternative 
and was widely subscribed to.)   
 
Related Figures and Tables:  Table 4 
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O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 N
Engineer 60% 66% 20% 53% 53% 13% 7% 13% 20% 13% 27% 7% 15
Contractor 57% 29% 29% 50% 36% 0% 7% 0% 43% 0% 50% 0% 14
Total 59% 48% 24% 52% 45% 7% 7% 7% 31% 7% 38% 3.5% 29
PhD 66% 66% 33% 33% 33% 0% 0% 0% 66% 0% 33% 0% 3
MA 55% 82% 18% 46% 55% 18% 9% 9% 9% 18% 27% 9% 11
BS 67% 22% 33% 56% 67% 0% 11% 11% 44% 0% 44% 0% 9
AA/HS 50% 17% 17% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 50% 0% 6
Total 59% 48% 24% 52% 45% 7% 7% 7% 31% 7% 38% 3.5% 29
1-10 50% 63% 13% 38% 38% 13% 25% 0% 13% 13% 50% 0% 8
11-20 88% 63% 38% 63% 50% 13% 0% 13% 38% 0% 38% 13% 8
21-30 50% 25% 25% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 38% 13% 50% 0% 8
31+ 40% 40% 20% 60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 5
Total 59% 48% 24% 52% 45% 7% 7% 7% 31% 7% 38% 3.5% 29
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O3. Remove windows as a partial demolition option which would also require 
removal of interior walls so that air could move through the building and reduce 
the wind resistance related to the overturning moment of the building.  This option 
was suggested by 24% of participants, but only carried through as a final option 
by one engineer. 
O4. Shore floors is primarily a strategy for transferring gravity loading around the 
damaged column.  Temporary columns are installed down through the building 
surrounding the location of the damage.  This option could either apply directly 
to shoring of floors or to the shoring of the beams carrying the floors.  This option 
was the second most popular and was suggested by 52% of participants and was 
implemented by several as their primary option. 
O5. Weld and shore wind beams to restore the integrity of the disrupted rigid wind 
frame on the exterior of the building.  This was the fourth most frequently 
suggested option, with 45% of participants mentioning it.  Several use it in 
combination with options 1 and 2. 
O6. Truss the 40th floor to achieve two objectives; first, it could help restore some of 
the integrity to the rigid wind frame. Second, it could possibly transfer loading 
from the damaged column line beyond the adjacent columns to outside columns 
that are not overstressed.  The truss would almost certainly have to be airlifted by 
a heavy lift helicopter and placement would require exquisite skill sets. This 
option was only mentioned by two participants (7%) and was not used in either 
of their final choices. 
O7. Reinforce the adjacent columns to carry the load safely around the damaged 
column through the adjacent columns.  This would require reinforcing columns 
many floors below the level of the damage, possibly all the way to the foundation.  
This option was mentioned by one engineer and one constructor (7%), but neither 
one listed it as a primary option. 
O8. Jack up the dropped column to reestablish the status-quo.  Even if the sunken 
floors could only be raised a few inches, jacking would perhaps put some of the 
gravity load back on the proper column line.  It would appear to be a logical 
partnering strategy with #5 above, which attempts to re-establish the status quo 
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of the wind frame.   Implementation could be very hazardous, as applying force 
could cause a shift in the damaged frame.  This option was mentioned by two 
engineers (7%), but neither advanced it as a strategy. 
O9. Remove debris on damaged floors to reduce the weight on or below the 
overloaded adjacent columns and reduce the loading on the severed column being 
carried by the exterior beams. Working on the damaged floors could be extremely 
dangerous.  Thirty one percent of participants suggested this option, 20% of 
engineers and 43% of constructors. 
O10. Establish a windshield around the damaged building to reduce wind load. 
However, this appears to be very difficult.  Wind tunnel tests on building models 
definitely show that adjacent wind blocks do reduce wind loading on structures 
and that the temporary shape of a structure can affect the actual wind loading. 
This, however, is a theory, not a proven design. How such principles could be 
implemented was not explained by the two engineers that discussed it and neither 
used this concept in his ultimate strategy.  Seven percent of the participants 
discussed this idea. 
O11. Implode or demolish with explosion in one of two ways. One is the civilian 
demolition business which is extremely precise, but normally requires weeks to 
design and install for a high-rise building.  Second is military demolition which 
normally uses far fewer charges, but can be installed in hours, if not minutes.  The 
military application would probably be accurate enough if there were adequate 
planning prior to the event.  The key issue, of course, is to bring the building 
straight down and not imperil adjacent structures.  Immediate implosion is the 
fifth (38%), most mentioned option. 
O12. Brace the exterior with cables to prevent the structure from moving in the wind.  
This is routinely done with very tall aerial antennae in rural locations.  Studies 
done for buildings in urban locations have been hampered by the lack of space 
and the unfortunate aesthetics that result.  However, in an emergency with 
government authority, a temporary bracing assistance from heavy cables might 
have some value.  The primary issues appear to be highly concentrated forces at 
the connection points on the building and the technical aspects of placing ground 
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anchors.  Prefabricated assemblies might be an answer.  Only one engineer toyed 
with this idea and he did not address serious issues in the concept.  It should be 
noted that the previous attempt to stabilize an oscillating structure with cables 
was the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940.  The 1½ inch diameter cables added to 
that structure “snapped like threads” in a relatively mild wind on two different 
occasions before final collapse. 
 
6.5.2    A View of Engineering Options from the Perspective of Decision-Making 
 A key point of the study is that participants must move from traditional engineering 
procedure into the realm of dynamic decision-making.  The basic premise of engineering, that 
all decisions rest on previously calculated conditions that are in turn supported by precise 
engineering laboratory studies, was largely abandoned for decision-making heuristics. 
 The Decision Flow-Chart for Expedient Hazard Mitigation (Figure 4, page 19) is 
essentially a sequential model based on normal engineering practice.  This, however, is 
overlaid with the heuristics introduced by the lack of time in an emergency.  This overlay 
reflects the action of the environment on the decision results in a manner that is normally not 
found in engineering design and decisions.  It can be argued that a primary result of this study 
is to identify the heuristics introduced by the lack of time and eventually to provide a heuristic 
base for decisions concerning various types of damage to buildings so that weeks of 
computation (or discussion/augmentation) will not be necessary. 
 Yang and Hwang, in their reappraisal of engineering decisions, have pointed out that 
theories and models for explaining human decision behavior is focused mainly on cognition of 
reasoning not of the broader perspective of decision-making.  This has resulted in previous 
models being deficient in accounting for the dynamic nature of decision-making.  A decision-
making task is usually accompanied by one or more decision processes, each of which may 
include many decision stages and the dominant mental activity carried out in each decision 
stage is reasoning.  They note that decision processes fall into two main categories, static 
decision processes and dynamic decision processes.  Static decision process means that no 
interaction exists between the decision-maker and their external environment.  That is the 
decision outcome will not change the state of the external environment.  They define dynamic 
decision-making as meaning that interaction does exist between the decision-maker and 
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external environment.  The decision outcome can change the state of the external environment 
and this can make a decision outcome deviate from the optimum condition.  The decision-
making involved with repair of a damaged high-rise building clearly falls into the area of 
dynamic decision-making.  That is, the changes to the building made by the participant will 
affect the external environment of future decisions.   
In this study, a lack of time (and non-existent formulas) resulted in the reduction of 
engineering theory into two key heuristic judgments, (1) evaluating a loss of lateral bracing 
and (2) evaluating the loss of columns supporting gravity loads.  The difficulty of applying 
values to these cue types leads to the wide variation in answers that we observe.  Many 
participants only identified one of the two cue types for decision-making and almost all of 
them indicated difficulty in assessing values to the cues for decision-making purposes.  This 
study is of value in evaluating the processes that the participants go through when they clearly 
do not have time to develop engineering calculations.  Indeed, it can be argued that the concepts 
of gravity support and lateral bracing, as well as demolition simply become rough 
approximations for the formulaic assessments that the engineering profession is supposedly 
based upon.  The decision-making process in some cases hints at a process called attribute 
substitution in which difficult-to-evaluate cue types are replaced by cue types with more easily 
evaluated data.  An example is a participant who declared the building beyond permanent 
repair for financial reasons and thus, circumvented the repair decisions with an immediate call 
for implosion.  This is a questionable decision shortcut considering that less than 15% of the 
building is damaged and immediate implosion will certainly deal major economic damage to 
the building’s occupant firms.  
 
6.6 Review of Participants Strategies 1-8 
During the exercise, the participants identified a total of 12 options for mitigation of 
the damaged structural building frame.  From his/her list of mitigation options (or no action), 
each participant was asked to select a single option as an action decision.  Coupled with this 
commitment was an assessment (yes/no) as to whether the building was permanently 
repairable.  The long-term repair assessment was important to understand the short-term 
mitigation option that was recommended.  This dual short-term/long-term decision is defined 
as the participant’s strategy, where “no action” is also a strategy.   
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Eight strategies (plus the unstated option of no action) were reviewed and organized 
according to their effects on the building’s structural system.  These strategies were to: 
1. Brace the structure – repair after storm. 
2. Brace the structure – demolish after storm. 
3. Shore the gravity loads – repair after storm. 
4. Shore the gravity loads – demolish after storm. 
5. Reduce lateral wind force – repair after storm. 
6. Implode the building immediately (demolish). 
7. Take no action – repair after storm. 
8. Take no action – demolish after storm. 
These eight solutions represent the final strategies of the 29 participants.  The 
participant’s belief as to the ultimate repair of the building may logically impact the decision 
for temporary repairs or even dictate implosion or a lack of action. 
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Table 20 - Properties of Various Strategies 
 
Strategy 
Immediate 
Response 
Permanent 
Repair 
Lateral 
Bracing 
Gravity 
Support 
1. Cable, Bolt, Weld – Brace 
Building then Repair 
Yes Yes Yes Limited 
2. Cable, Bolt, Weld – Brace 
Building then Demolish 
Yes No Yes Limited 
3. Gravity Shoring then Repair Yes Yes Limited Yes 
4. Gravity Shoring then 
Demolish 
Yes No Limited Yes 
5. Remove Window Walls 
then Repair 
Yes Yes 
Reduces 
Lateral 
Load 
No 
6. Implosion Yes No N/A N/A 
7. No Action then Repair No Yes No No 
8. No Action then Demolish No No No No 
 
The relations of the (short-term) mitigation options to ultimate strategies are shown in 
Table 21.  There is one additional strategy that is represented by mitigation option 9, the 
removal of debris.  This option is a special case of the strategy of reducing gravity loading.  
However, no participant selected this as his action decision.  The following pages show two 
tables (21 and 22) discussing the eight strategies and track them on the Proposed Decision 
Flow Chart.  
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Table 21 - Relation of Expedient Mitigation Options to Final Strategies 
 
Expedient Mitigation Options Developed by 
Participants 
Number Identity of Final Strategy 
Incorporating Option 
 Strategies for 
Permanent Repair 
Strategies for 
Demolition 
O1. Weld cracks/gaps in columns and beams S1 S2 
O2. Brace frame S1 S2 
O3. Remove windows S5 Not used (S9*) 
O4. Shore sagging floors S3 S4 
O5. Weld/shore wind beams S1 S2 
O6. Install truss on floor 40 Not used (S1) Not used (S2) 
O7. Reinforce adjacent column S1 Not used (S2) 
O8. Jack up columns Not used (S1) Not used (S2) 
O9. Remove debris Not used (S10*) Not used (S11*) 
O10. Install windshield Not used (S5) Not used (S9*) 
O11. Implode building N/A S8 
O12. Brace building exterior Not used (S1) Not used (S2) 
(No repair action) S6 S7 
*S9-S11 are labels for strategies that are theoretically possible, but were not used by any participants. 
 
Related Figures and Tables:  Figure 9 and Tables 19 and 20 
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Table 22 - Strategies by Profession, Education, and Experience 
 
 
 
Related Tables: Tables 20 and 21  
This table lists the eight strategies and the frequency they were chosen by participants 
based on profession, education, and experience.  The superscripts represent the subset of 
managers or executives in each entry.  For instance, there are 2 managers/executives among 
the 6 individuals listed under S1 - Engineer. 
The first four S1 through S4 are immediate repair options requiring highly skilled 
workers.  The last four, S5 through S8 are no action or demolition options, generally requiring 
less skill except for S8 which would require military skills. 
There are no significant differences by profession, education or experience. 
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Subtotal
Engineer 6
(2)
2 3 0 1
(1)
3
 (2)
0 0 15
(5)
Contractor 5
(1)
0 2 1
(1)
0 3
 (1)
1 2 14
(3)
Subtotal 11
(3)
2 5 1
(1)
1
(1)
6
(3)
1 2 29
(8)
PhD 1 1 0 0 1
(1)
0 0 0 3
 (1)
MA 5
(2)
1 2 0 0 3
 (2)
0 0 11
 (4)
BS 4
(1)
0 1 1
(1)
0 2
(1)
0 1 9
(3)
AA 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 6
Subtotal 11
(3)
2 5 1
(1)
1
(1)
6
(3)
1 2 29
(8)
1-10 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 8
11-20 3
 (1)
0 2 0 0 2
(1)
0 0 7
(2)
21-30 3
 (1)
0 1 1
(1)
0 1
(1)
1 0 7
(3)
31+ 3
 (1)
0 1 0 1
(1)
1
(1)
0 1 7
(3)
Subtotal 11
(3)
2 5 1
(1)
1
(1)
6
(3)
1 2 29
(8)
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Strategy 1: Brace the Frame – Permanent Repair Engineers: 6/15, Constructors: 5/14 
 As indicated in Figure 10, these participants answered, “yes” to Decision #1 in Section 
5, “Would you initiate work to increase the building’s ability to survive anticipate storm winds 
of 60 mph expected in 48 hours?” The participants also answered “yes” to Decision #4 in 
Section 5, “Assuming that the building survives the coming storm, do you believe the building 
can be permanently repaired?” Participants proposing this strategy advocated taking key 
actions to analyze the situation in D1 and D2 and would direct constructors to implement 
various expedient mitigation options in D3 using cabling, bolting or welding connections to 
(1) brace the building or (2) reinforce or reconnect damaged structural members or both.   
 Discussion of Strategy: This strategy incorporates expedient hazard mitigation options 
that are solutions to two separate issues.  First, maintaining the overall stability of the 
undamaged portion of the building involves increasing the wind bracing to replace the rigidity 
lost in the damaged area.  Second, repairs to severed and failing structural members in the 
damaged area can assist in preventing progressive column failure that would further 
compromise the overall structure.  The participants who chose this approach were equally 
likely to be an engineer or a constructor and represented a cross section of experience and 
education (see Table 22).  In all 11 specific questions (See Section 6.4), there do not appear to 
be any distinctive characteristics common to this group of participants that separates them from 
their peers.  In identification of Key Actions for Emergency Response, the engineers in this 
group, again appeared to fall close to the values of their peers. However, the constructors in 
this group consistently identified a higher percentage of Key Actions than their peers. In 
identifying Options for Expedient Hazard Mitigation, both engineers and constructors again 
performed similarly to their peers without the radical departures that will occasionally be seen 
later in participants using Strategies 5, 6 and 7. 
 The question concerning the time required for engineers to analyze the problem prior 
to beginning repairs brought substantial variance in time estimates ranging from a few hours 
to a week or more.  The distribution did not seem to be associated with profession, education 
or experience (see Table 22).  For instance, the Strategy 1 
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engineers had a mean of 2.7 days with six estimates of one day and five estimates of five days.  
The Strategy 1 constructors had a mean of 2.5 with seven estimates of one day and four 
estimates of five days.  The remaining answers fell between the extremes.   This extreme 
variation in the answers can probably be attributed to conflicting concepts of how to approach 
the problem.  Some participants are focused on the expedient aspect of shortcutting the problem 
while others are concerned with a thorough understanding of the issues prior to any decision-
making.  This leads to extremes of answers from a few hours to several days. 
 The opportunity for participants to use government authority to solve a transportation 
problem led to one of the widest response gaps of the exercise.  The problem was a key 
engineer stranded by traffic hours from the site.  All six engineers eschewed any use of 
government transportation, while failing to find an alternative solution.  Meanwhile, four of 
the five constructors turned to government authority for emergency transportation.  The overall 
difference between professions (as shown in Table 9) was 42.9% of constructors use 
government authority while only 13.3% of engineers did so.  This may reflect a certain street 
savvy of constructor’s real-world experiences. 
 The question of critical wind velocity to initiate collapse of the crippled building 
resulted in a remarkably even division between professions.  Engineers and constructors in this 
strategy believe the critical wind speed to be below 40 mph. One of each thought the speed 
was 40 to 50 and one engineer thought the critical speed to be 50 to 60 mph.  Thus, two groups 
which split significantly on some areas had a high level of agreement on structural strength of 
the building, even though the engineering group is highly trained in evaluation of structural 
strength and the constructors have minimal formal education in this area.  This, again, suggests 
a participant’s formal education is of little use in producing this answer or that education 
contributes little beyond what expertise is conferred by having some experience in the subject 
matter.  As suggested previously, the disarray of the damaged structure negates the value of 
conventional structural calculations.  At the same time, Strategy 1 naturally appeals to 
participants who believe that the building is vulnerable to wind and therefore needs lateral 
bracing.  This reinforces the concept of bracing the building as a key component of the division 
of strategies.  This specific question of the likelihood of collapse prior to the arrival of the 
predicted storm gave a relatively tight distribution of estimates with a median response of a 
25% chance of collapse and only 0% and 50% receiving endorsements from the remaining 
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participants.  One constructor chose 0% and one engineer and a constructor chose 50%. Again, 
among the participants endorsing Strategy 1, there is close agreement about the immediate risk. 
 The question of evacuation radius gave a nearly uniform distribution from one to five 
blocks.  The question was open-ended and a few respondents gave answers above five blocks.  
For evaluation, the highest answer was restricted to “five or more” blocks.  It should be noted 
that a five block evacuation radius would totally clear 121 blocks assuming the subject building 
is block zero.  This impact will be further discussed in Section 8.1.  Seven of the Strategy 1 
participants estimated a 25% chance of domino collapse.  One engineer estimated 0% chance, 
one constructor estimated 50% and the remaining engineers and constructors chose 75%.  No 
one felt that domino collapse was 100% certain. 
 The impact of potential legal liability on participants’ decisions is revealed in the four 
related questions of (1) willingness to immediately give advice, (2) reaction to executive 
suggestion to seek legal advice, (3) restriction of advice over a period of time after the 
executive suggestion, and (4) restriction of advice after professional liability insurance is 
canceled. 
 Briefly, ten of the 11 Strategy 1 participants volunteered initial advice without 
condition. The other had minor qualms, but still gave advice.  Interestingly enough, this was 
the only participant of the 29 who had initial reservations.  This group also consistently took 
stronger than average action to seek legal advice in Table 8.  All 11 of these participants 
contacted lawyers as suggested by their CEO, while at least seven of the total group made no 
call at all.  However, only one of the 11 Strategy 1 participants restricted advice and he had 
consistently done so earlier.  Therefore, the group appears to be very stable and cohesive prior 
to the final question in which they are notified that their professional liability insurance has 
been canceled.  At this point, the group destabilizes.  Eight individuals stop advice pending 
indemnification or defer to a higher authority.  One places minor restriction on advice.  Only 
two participants maintain the advisor capacity that they had earlier.  Thus, the resolve of the 
group was severely disrupted by the loss of professional liability coverage and the critical flow 
of consulting advice ceased from almost all participants. 
Summary of Strategy 1: A group of 11 participants, spread evenly over the testing 
population in profession, experience, and education approached the problem with a systematic 
method.  Their repair strategies involved welding, cabling, or bolting as discussed in Section 
 69 
 
 
6.5. These participants showed agreement in the areas of critical wind speed to collapse the 
building (lower than other participants), and estimated chance of collapse prior to the 
windstorm (about 25%).  There was agreement in rejecting possible legal threats to the 
decision-making process although the loss of professional liability insurance finally led to the 
collapse of this resistance and most assistance was withdrawn.  There was lack of agreement 
on evacuation radius although the answers appeared to be related to the participant’s personal 
belief in the risk of sequential building failure (domino failure).  On the use of government 
authority or assistance, the constructors were quicker to agree to government assets for 
transportation or demolition than engineers, probably due to daily experience. 
 
Strategy 2: Brace The Frame – Demolish - Participants E2, E6.  
 These participants made the same expedient hazard mitigation decisions as those in 
Strategy 1, but Strategy 2 participants do not believe building is going to be repairable. These 
participants answered “yes” to Decision #1 in Section 5, “Would you initiate work to increase 
the building’s ability to survive anticipated storm winds of 60 mph expected in 48 hours?” 
They then answered “no” to Decision #4 in Section 5, “Assuming that the building survives 
the storm, do you believe the building can be permanently repaired?” 
 Discussion of Strategy: These participants were very concerned about the condition of 
the “undamaged” portion of the building frame either for reasons of overstressing from the 
explosion or from extreme stresses induced by the dropping of the severed column and the 
simultaneous mass failure of the thirty-eight girders on floors 23 through 40.  E2 noted 
specifically that he believed the building must be skewed and that the cost of repairs would 
exceed the value of the repaired building.  He did, however, mention the concept of only 
demolishing the top 20 floors and rebuilding from that point up.  E6 also estimated that the 
ultimate cost of permanent repairs may exceed the value of the building and that the market 
would dictate demolition after the storm.  This participant’s belief that the building could 
survive for the short term, but will be unusable due to distortion recalls a unique experience in 
1970 in Lubbock, Texas. A 20 story high rise building survived a tornado but sat vacant for 5 
years with a twisted frame.  Engineers were divided about strategies, but it was eventually 
repaired.  At the same time that participants E2 and E6 listed these concerns in Section 5, they 
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expressed average or above average confidence that the building could survive with reasonable 
repair efforts. 
 E2 and E6 had typical responses in key actions and listing of options for repair.  Both 
participants listed column repair, bracing the frame, and shoring as possible options.  E2 added 
reinforcing the damaged wind beam as well.  For engineering analysis however, E2 saw only 
one day for analysis while E6 saw five days.  The participants did not indicate whether these 
differences in time perception are related to the magnitude of the problem, the availability of 
resources, variation in the degree of documentation for repair to begin, or perhaps, extensive 
checking of the frame for less visible damage. 
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E2 did not plan to use government assistance at all.  E6 did so to a minimal degree for a police 
escort.  As noted in Table 9, 87% of all engineers did not invoke government authority. 
 E2 believed that the building could withstand 80 mph winds and E6 believed the 
building was good for 50 mph winds.  The mean for engineers was 51.3 mph, so E2 was much 
more optimistic than average.  Both of these engineers believed the collapse risk in the first 24 
hours before expedient hazard mitigation can be implemented is 25%.  The mean for engineers 
was 22% and constructors was 30%, so E2 and E6 were typical of all participants in this 
respect.  Also, both engineers only estimated the chance of domino failures at 25%, but one 
called for an evacuation radius of two blocks and the other recommended three blocks. 
 Both of these individuals showed some concern in one of the four questions that reflect 
participants’ responses to the mention of legal liability and the suggestion of withdrawal of 
professional liability insurance.  E2 was concerned about giving advice after his CEO 
suggested he talk to a lawyer and both E2 and E6 said they would withdraw assistance if 
liability insurance were cancelled.  Both were willing to consider continuing if fully protected 
from liability. 
 Summary of Strategy 2: Two highly educated engineers with low and medium 
experience are concerned that the extreme stress of the event has damaged the frame beyond 
reasonable or cost-effective repair.  They recommend measures to survive the storm, but 
anticipate orderly demolition later. 
 
Strategy 3: Gravity Shoring – Permanent Repair - Participants E3, E7, E9, C8 and C14.  P
 Participants recommended various actions to increase the building’s ability to survive 
at D3 other than the previously discussed actions of bolting, welding, and cabling.  If the 
building survived the storm, the participants believed it is feasible to repair it. All of these 
participants answered “Yes” to Decision #1 in Section 5 “Would you initiate work to 
increase the building’s ability to survive anticipated storm winds of 60 mph expected in 48 
hours?” All of these participants answered “Yes” to Decision #4 in Section 5 “Assuming that 
the building survives the storm, do you believe the building can be permanently repaired?” 
 Discussion of Strategy:  These participants had ideas for other strategies to D3 to 
survive the storm, but like the participants in Strategy #1, believed that the building could be 
put back into service.  All three of the engineers identified similar concerns about repairing the 
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severed column or the resulting crack propagation and shoring the column or floors to address 
the gravity load in the damaged area.  In addition to compression shoring (columns), they also 
proposed tension schemes utilizing cables along the outside of the building. The constructors 
saw similar problems and responded with shoring schemes to help support the collapsed floors.  
As before, the constructors showed great awareness of the time necessary to implement their 
schemes.  C8 also considered an alternate idea of removing window glass to reduce wind 
loading as an option for immediate repair, but did not act on it in his final strategy. 
 As a point of reference, the two most experienced engineers also believed that a 
“proper” engineering analysis would require five days or more before temporary repairs would 
start.  This supports the earlier conjecture that the requirements for expedient hazard mitigation 
and traditional engineering practice are incompatible in an emergency. 
 Of the three engineers and the two constructors using Strategy 3, only one engineer 
suggested using government authority and that was only for escort purposes. 
 Responses to another question show that all five participants in Strategy 3 believed the 
building could collapse at very low wind speed, 40 mph or less.  Indeed E3, C8 and C14 
believed the building to be a 50% risk of collapsing in the first 24 hours.  These opinions would 
logically lead to efforts to shore the building, assuming the participant did not believe the 
structure to be too dangerous to work on. 
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Four of the participants believe two or three blocks to be an adequate evacuation radius, but 
C8 is concerned enough to request five or more blocks.  Participants E3, E7 and C8 also believe 
the possibility of domino failures to be 50%, which is higher than the average for all 
participants. Questions about legal and liability issues related to consulting in a high-risk 
situation did not elicit concern from any members of this group except for E9, who indicated 
he would withdraw all assistance upon notice that his firm’s liability insurance would not cover 
this consulting situation.  C8 required an immediate release of liability to continue.  E3 showed 
much concern early in this series of questions, but relaxed as the exercise proceeded.  The 
remaining participants indicated some hesitation, but not to the point of disrupting the process. 
 Of special interest is the evaluation process noted by participant E3 who identified three 
issues inherent in D3.  First, there is a need to stabilize the beam crack propagation and by 
inference the severed column that caused the cracking.  Second, there is also a need to stabilize 
the gravity system globally, and third, there is a need to address the issue of the compromised 
moment connections relative to the lateral resistance of the wind frame.  This participant’s 
response was one of the most coherent attempts to organize the different structural issues 
inherent in the problem and perhaps is a future guideline.   
 Summary of Strategy 3:  Five individuals explored repair options other than welding, 
bolting and internal cabling.  Their strategies revolved around shoring with some attention to 
damage details.  Legal and liability issues appear to have minimum influence on their decision-
making.  All participants believed the building to be at higher risk than previous groups have 
thought and they focused their attention on the gravity loading issues in the damaged bays.  
One participant appeared to identify various components of the problem more clearly than 
other participants at Decision 3. 
 
Strategy 4: Gravity Shoring – Demolition – Participant C6:   
 This participant believed the building can survive the storm, but that it is too badly 
damaged to be economically repaired and returned to service. This participant answered “yes” 
to Decision #1 in Section 5, “Would you initiate work to increase the building’s ability to 
survive anticipated storm winds of 60 mph in 48 hours?”  C6’s strategy was to support the 
dropped floors with shoring.  This participant answered “no” to Decision #4, “Assuming that 
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the building survives the coming storm, do you believe the building can be permanently 
repaired?” 
 Discussion of Strategy:  This executive constructor believed shoring to be the practical 
short-term strategy for expedient hazard mitigation.  After listing five typical key emergency 
assessment and incident management actions to start with, Participant C6 listed six options for 
expedient hazard mitigation and systematically eliminated them for reasons of excessive risk 
or lack of time.  By default, he was left with a shoring and column-bracing scheme to help 
distribute the gravity loading in the collapsed area. 
 C6 believed that the design time for temporary mitigation is only a few hours.  This 
estimate is consistent with the shoring concepts that he proposed, but is significantly less repair 
time than the rest of the participants estimated would be needed. 
 On the question of initiative in using government authority, C6 made no use of the 
power, which is the same response as 57% of the constructors. 
 In questions dealing with the risk of wind induced structural collapse, C6 responded 
that the building could collapse at 40 mph or less.  Consistent with this belief, C6 estimated 
the risk of collapse in 24 hours, to be 25%.  Both responses were similar to those of the majority 
of participants. 
 Regarding the risk to surrounding buildings from domino failure, he estimated 0%, 
with substantially less concern about collapse than the other participants; 83% of them said 
25% or more.  In response to the question about safe radius for evacuation, C6 called for an 
extreme distance of five plus blocks (actually six on his questionnaire) specifically because of 
the asbestos identified in the photographs, rather than for the risk to adjacent buildings.  C6 
referred to the liability issue of the asbestos, presumably from the asbestos cloud during 9/11. 
 In response to the question about legal liability, C6 showed major concern after being 
told to talk with the company attorney.  After the threat of a loss of liability insurance, C6 
added that he would need a full liability release. 
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In comments in Section 5, Decision #4, C6 commented that the structural engineer will 
have major long-term concerns about the effects of the explosion on concealed connections at 
a distance from the blast location on Floor 21.  He also noted that a partial demolition to 
accomplish permanent repairs would put unknown stresses on the remaining building frame.  
His ideas for Key Actions were typical of those provided by the other participants. 
 Summary of Strategy 4: An executive constructor with a civil engineering degree 
believes he can save the building from the storm.  However, he believes the explosion and 
partial collapse may have induced such stress in the frame of the building that there may be 
long-term structural issues that make the building unsuitable for repair.  He also has 
considerable concern about asbestos and requests an unusually large evacuation radius for that 
reason.  He is not particularly concerned about sequential (domino) failure and he intends to 
demolish the building after the storm. 
 
Strategy 5: Remove Walls – Participant E14: 
This participant recommended partial demolition by removing windows and interior 
walls in upper floors to reduce the building’s wind resistance.  After the storm, the building 
would be repaired and returned to service. The engineer answered “yes” to Decision #1 in 
Section 5, “Would you initiate work to increase the building’s ability to survive anticipated 
storm winds of 60 mph in 48 hours?”  His strategy to reduce wind resistance separated this 
strategy from all others. He also answered “yes” to Decision #4, “Assuming that the building 
survives the coming storm, do you believe the building can be permanently repaired?” 
 Review of Strategy: This highly educated and experienced engineer only focused on 
two expedient hazard mitigation options.  The first option was to reduce the building’s wind 
resistance by removing both windows and interior partitions to allow wind to blow through the 
building.  The second was to cable brace the steel frame of the building to restore some of the 
wind bracing lost in the damaged bays.  However, he did express concern that the cracked 
beam could fail completely, resulting in “fracturing of welds between beam and columns-
unzipping,” but did not carry this scenario to any conclusion.  After reviewing the situation, he 
decided that reducing the wind resistance would be adequate and settled on removing the 
windows and interior partitions. The reduction of wind stress was his main strategy. 
 79 
 
 
 He believed that the time to analyze the building to do repairs would only take a few 
hours which is in the lower half of the distribution.  Moreover, this highly educated executive 
engineer stated that he did not see any issue that required extraordinary measures for recovery, 
so he did not bother with government assistance for transporting engineers. 
 This participant did not show major concern about the legal issues and liability.  His 
summation of legalities and liabilities was that, although he would discuss the cancellation of 
insurance with legal counsel, “I believe that the engineer’s fundamental duty to protect life 
would predominate all considerations.”  He indicated that the remaining building frame could 
withstand 80 mph winds, which were in the top 10% of participants’ estimates, and that the 
chance of failure in 24 hours was 0% which is in the bottom 20% of the participants’ responses.  
That is, he had much higher confidence in the damaged building than the other participants. 
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E14 doubted that a collapse would lead to more than one additional building collapsing, 
although he called a domino failure a 25% chance.  He noted that he would expect a basically 
vertical collapse with “some leaning” during the fall.  From this concern, he advised an 
evacuation radius of three blocks which is right in the middle of the distribution of responses. 
 E14 laid out a detailed procedure for analysis of the total damage after the building 
survived the storm and outlined a detailed review to confirm the financial viability of returning 
the building to service. 
 Summary of Strategy 5: The exercise’s most educated and experienced participant 
proposed an unusual strategy of partial demolition of the upper floors to reduce wind 
resistance.  He recommended the removal of windows and interior partitions to allow wind to 
blow through.  He believed the building could survive the storm, but raised issues of possible 
beam to column connection (weld) failures without specifically stating a repair strategy.  This 
strategy assumes building survival without repair.  E14 outlined a structural and detailed 
financial review following the storm to confirm his belief that the building can be saved.  This 
individual showed a high level of confidence throughout the exercise.  He showed very little 
concern about legal liability and indeed, wrote a statement about an engineer’s responsibility 
to society in such a situation, overriding his own liability concerns. 
 
Strategy 6:  No Action – Permanent Repair – Participants E5, E11, E12, C1, C3 AND C5:  
 These participants’ final decision was to forgo action and withdraw from site.  They 
answered “no” to Decision #1 in Section 5, “Would you initiate work to increase the 
building’s ability to survive storm winds of 60 MPH expected in 48 hours?”  They answered 
“yes” to Decision #4 in Section 5 “Assuming the building survives the storm, do you believe 
the building can be permanently repaired?”  
 Discussion of Strategy:  These six participants had ideas similar to those of other 
participants for bracing and shoring, but apparently had reservations as to how quickly the 
ideas could be implemented.  Only E12 stated he had no ideas (a notation of 0 in Table 19), 
but this was with the stated proviso that time is extremely short and he proceeded to list shoring 
as an intermediate response to long-term repairs if the building survived.   
 Participants E5, C1, and C3 showed higher than average levels of concern about legal 
liability and also showed extreme reactions to possible loss of professional liability insurance 
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to the extent of stopping all advice.  Hence, they decided to make no effort to save the building.  
Also, logically contributing to this position for E11, E12, C1, C3 and C5 is a belief that the 
building can withstand higher winds without repair than most participants believed possible.  
Consistent with this position, E11, E12 and C5 expressed a belief that the building was in no 
danger of failure (0%) in 24 hours from the existing winds that were described as being from 
fifteen to twenty-five miles per hour.  It must be noted that this confidence stemmed from the 
strength of the remaining undamaged frame.  However, at the same time, C1 and C3 did show 
great concern about the short-term failure (24 hours) of the damaged portion of the frame from 
progressive tearing of steel.  As a result, they expressed concern about the risk of putting 
workers in the building to brace against the storm.  Thus, opposite beliefs contributed to lack 
of action.  E5, E11, E12, C1, C3 and C5 responses are typical for their experience tiers for the 
key actions.  The same is true for expedient hazard mitigation, except for E12, who gave a 
score of 0, (as discussed above), perhaps indicating a preconceived course of action. The other 
five individuals had various ideas for expedient hazard mitigation, but, as discussed above, 
chose not to implement them. 
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This group of participants estimated response time for repair to be one or two days with the 
exception of one constructor who thought the drawings might require a week.   
 Only one participant called for government assistance, a constructor with moderate 
experience.  He, however, had multiple ideas of how the government might assist including 
police escorts and government helicopters. 
 The two engineers of this group had no concern about domino failure, although the 
constructors had a much higher level of concern that a collapse could compromise surrounding 
buildings. 
 The evacuation radius recommended by these participants varied considerably with 
both engineers calling for one block and constructors requesting an average of almost four 
blocks.  As we noted previously, this correlates with some participant’s greater concern about 
domino failure. 
 Summary of Strategy 6:  Six participants rejected expedient hazard mitigation for 
various reasons including concern about professional liability, fear of workers being caught in 
a rapid collapse from fatigued steel, and a belief that the undamaged portion of the frame could 
survive a short duration storm without additional work.  In the written answers, there was 
evidence that participants had conflicts over two different models of failure.  First was the issue 
of the steel girder (beam), which was visibly torn and might be progressing in its failure.  If it 
did completely sever and allow the severed column to slide from its position on the lower stub, 
there was concern it could trigger a progressive failure of the adjacent beams above the same 
column line.  The second issue was the overall strength of the remaining undamaged rigid 
building frame.  These participants tended to address these issues separately and seemed to be 
making decisions on the basis of either one or the other.  There is no evidence that anyone 
choosing Strategy 6 had effectively integrated the two separate issues, which appears to be a 
major confounding factor for participants for both analysis of the risk and the expedient hazard 
mitigation strategies.  It would seem reasonable that two or more separate strategies are 
required, perhaps of completely different engineering design, materials and skills. 
 
Strategy 7: No Action – Demolition – Participant C11:   
 This participant recommended no action.  If the building survived, he believed it would 
be demolished.  (See the flow chart on the following page).  As in Strategy 6, this participant 
 85 
 
 
answered “no” to Decision 1 in Section 5, (“Would you initiate work to increase the building’s 
ability to survive anticipated winds of 60 mph expected in 48 hours?”) In addition, this 
participant also answered “no” to Decision 4 in Section 5, that is, “Assuming that the building 
survives the coming storm, do you believe the building can be permanently repaired?” 
 Discussion of Strategy:  This participant was very concerned about an early failure of 
the building, believing that it was too dangerous to initiate work on (50% chance of collapse), 
that domino failure was a severe danger (100%), and advising a rapid, widespread evacuation 
of many blocks of downtown area.  This participant had the highest concern of any participants 
on the questions about the critical wind speed to induce structural failure, the risk of collapse 
in 24 hours, the safe radius for evacuation, the chance of domino failure, and the time necessary 
to analyze damage and begin repairs.  C11 believed that domino failure was very likely if the 
damaged building toppled.  At the same time, he expressed no concern about legal liability and 
volunteered that he would consult even if his firm’s insurance were cancelled.  This willingness 
to assist strongly suggests he is not avoiding expedient hazard mitigation for fear of liability.  
In Key Actions for Emergency Response, his number of responses is reasonably typical for his 
experience although on the low end. This participant did not list any expedient hazard 
mitigation options.  Of special interest is that the subject had no formal construction 
management or engineering education above the high school level and therefore, may not be 
aware of the potential of a disrupted rigid frame to support itself.  Again, the lack of structural 
education may lead to a conservative overreaction.  
 C11 makes no use of government authority for the mitigation of the building’s 
problems.  He is totally focused on evacuation of the area.   
 Summary of Strategy 7:  An experienced constructor believed the building is more 
dangerous than most other participants believe and recommended withdrawal from the area 
and extensive evacuation.  His concerns are consistent with his recommendations.  He also 
believed the building to be too badly damaged for repair even if it survived the storm. There is 
reason to believe his lack of formal training in engineering is contributing to the difference of 
his response from the other participants.  His technical background is 
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similar to that of fire department emergency personnel and it should be not be unreasonable to 
expect similar extremely conservative reactions. 
 
Strategy 8:  Immediate Implosion – Participants C2 and C12 proposed that controlled 
demolition (implosion) be used to demolish the building prior to storm.  Even if the building 
did survive the storm, these participants did not believe it to be repairable at reasonable cost. 
Both participants answered “no” to Decision #1 in Section 5, (“Would you initiate work to 
increase the building’s ability to survive anticipated winds of 60 mph expected in 48 hours.”) 
Both participants confirmed their decision for implosion by answering “no” to Decision #4 in 
Section 5, “Assuming that the building survives the coming storm, do you believe the 
building can be permanently repaired?”  This, in turn, reinforces the decision not to attempt 
immediate repair. 
Discussion of Strategy: Participants C2 and C12 outlined their analysis of the problem 
and the search for a qualified engineer. C2 attempted to fly the stranded engineer to the site by 
government helicopter.  However, both also proposed simultaneously mobilizing a demolition 
constructor (and C12 referred to possible assistance from the government.)  C2 suggested 
shoring as an expedient hazard mitigation measure, with concern for tying the damaged wind 
beams back to the building’s center columns to avoid additional failure of secondary beams, 
but rejected the long-term repair of the building (Decision 4 above) and opted for demolition.  
C12 looked only to a consulting engineer for ideas and did not recommend any specific 
mitigation action himself.  Implosion became his final strategy by default. 
Regarding their estimates of time required to analyze damage and begin temporary 
repairs, C2 believed the time to be only a few hours, consistent with his concept of shoring the 
floors.  C12 gave a time estimate of over five days for analysis of the building’s condition and 
engineering, which is well beyond the two days available for analysis, engineering and repair.   
 As indicated above, C2 and C12, they both showed a willingness to call on government 
resources.  C2 recommended exploring the use of government helicopters for transportation.  
C12 recommended military or police assistance in the form of dogs to sniff out additional 
explosives in the building. 
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 In response to the question about critical wind speed to induce structural failure, C2 
believed the building could collapse in a 40 mph wind and C12 indicated a collapse point at 
50 mph, which are close to average for construction personnel (about 46 mph).  Regarding the 
risk of collapse in 24 hours, both construction managers showed slightly less concern than 
other construction personnel (50% compared to a mean of 55%).  Regarding their estimates of 
safe radius for evacuation, C2 called for a two-block radius (near the mean) while C12 called 
for 4 blocks (top 30%).  For their estimates of chance of domino failure, C2 believed the risk 
to be 25% (the most common response) while C12 estimated 50% (in the top third). Regarding 
their reaction to the suggestion to talk to a lawyer and their legal concern on giving advice, 
these individuals did not show undue concern over contacting a lawyer and did not severely 
restrict advice.  Also of interest are their responses to the risk of delay to engineering and 
construction caused by liability issues.  In this question, both participants reacted strongly to a 
suggestion of withdrawal of their firm’s liability coverage.  C2 required an immediate liability 
release and C12 indicated he would severely limit advice. 
 Summary of Strategy 8:  Two constructors with varying experience believed the 
building to be at risk without adequate means of expedient hazard mitigation and proposed 
controlled demolition to destroy the building prior to the arrival of the storm winds.  They 
shared concern about liability issues and a belief that the building could collapse in relatively 
low winds with a fifty percent risk of collapsing in twenty-four hours.  C12 also believed that 
an engineered expedient hazard mitigation strategy could take five days to implement with 
only two days available.  A major issue appears to be that the participants have few ideas to 
reduce risk to the building other than rapid demolition.  As with participant C11 in Strategy 2, 
C12 was highly experienced, but without formal training in engineering or construction 
science. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
 This section summarizes the results of the exercise and uses these results to address the 
research objectives described in Section 4.0.  
 
7.1       Discussion of Proposed Model – Decision Points 
            Question 1: Are Decision Points Approached in the Order Hypothesized? 
 The eight decision flow chart strategies are all within the pattern presented in Section 
3.0.  The flow chart anticipated normal engineering practice without concern for time 
constraints.  The participants’ decision-making processes appeared to closely follow normal 
engineering practice not only in form, but also in pace.  There is little evidence of decisions 
being accelerated by anticipation or overlapping of procedures.  Although all participants 
expected to go to the building and the majority of participants would search for plans to the 
building, few would mobilize steel workers prior to discussing analysis of the problem even 
though the need of steel workers’ skills was evident.  Other key actions were seldom 
anticipated, such as need for surveying instruments to check the verticality of the building.  
This was lacking even though P-Delta lever loading issues (see Section 1 and Figure 1) should 
be intuitive, at least for the engineers.  Acceleration of these key actions that would be 
necessary for a different pattern of decision-making was rare, even in the problems in Section 
2, where the participants saw clear photographs of the nature and extent of the damage. 
 With a few notable exceptions, the formality and pace of routine procedure was 
followed.  The variation in initial key actions included differences between participants in their 
approaches to the assessment of the problem. The rule of thumb in this unprecedented situation 
was to go to the site, get a visual assessment of the damage and then run through possible 
strategies based on the individual’s previous experience and education.  The participants 
identified 12 options for expedient hazard mitigation at decision points D2 (between implosion, 
partial demolition, and repair directions), D3 (specific repair alternatives) and D5 (specific 
demolition alternatives).  These 12 options are listed in Section 6.5. Thus, on critical expedient 
mitigation options at Decision D3, engineers and constructors reviewed similar ideas to 
consider gravity shoring of the building’s visibly damaged floors, (53% vs. 50% in Table 19) 
and to consider correcting the visible column and beam cracking (60% vs. 57% in Table 19).  
However, the practicing engineers were twice as likely to identify the theory of the 
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compromised wind frame and review the need to brace the wind frame (66% to 29% in Table 
19). One constructor and one engineer did not review bracing, but would achieve an equivalent 
effect by reducing wind loading (the removal of glass and partitions). Thus, the ratio of 
engineers to constructors who addressed the wind-loading problem is still two to one. 
 Similarly, several constructors’ training and experience led them to reject their own 
judgment and repeatedly seek licensed engineers depending on how far the decision was from 
their normal responsibility. Ironically, many ideas from constructors were similar to engineers, 
but they would not take responsibility to implement them notably because of the traditional 
rigid separation of professional responsibilities.  Thus, the answer to the question, “Are 
decision points approached in the order hypothesized” is “yes.” 
 
7.2  Discussion of the Proposed Model – Experts and Options 
 Question 2:  Do experts really identify all the options open to them? 
 This question has two components, the first of which is the set of key emergency 
assessment and incident management actions that began early in the exercise to access the 
situation and prepare a response to the risk.  The second component is the expedient mitigation 
actions that involved actual construction work on the building. 
 Table 6, Key Actions for Emergency Response, showed that, on average, each engineer 
only identified 36.4% and each constructor only identified 41.8% of the 12 key actions that 
were generated by the group as a whole.  Again, we note that these actions are ones that 
participants themselves identified, not ones that were produced by other sources. 
 In Table 19, Options for Expedient Hazard Mitigation, the first five expedient 
mitigation options were the most frequently identified by the participants.  The most frequently 
listed option for expedient mitigation by constructors and engineers was repair or bracing of 
the damaged column and the cracked wind girder (beam), with 60% of engineers and 57% of 
constructors listing this strategy.  The option most frequently listed by engineers was 
temporary bracing of the wind frame, with 66% of engineers listing this option. By contrast, 
only 29% of constructors did so. 
 On average, Table 19 indicates the engineers mentioned only 50.4% of the five primary 
expedient mitigation options and the constructors mentioned only 40.2% of them.  The 
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secondary options had even lower frequency of mention.  Thus, the answer to Question 2, “Do 
experts identify all options open to them?” is “no”. 
 
7.2.1  Discussion of Propose Model- Subordinate Questions 
 Subordinate questions.  Do experts consider multiple options at the same time or even 
reverse the order of decisions?  The answer appears to vary with the participants.  The specific 
path followed depends on multiple perceptions of the participants.  The D1 Decision (“Should 
I conduct a detailed assessment?”) is an “Action” or “No Action” decision related to concern 
about personal accountability, i.e. fear of highly publicized professional error, lack of ideas for 
mitigation, or confidence that the building is stable enough to survive the approaching storm 
front. 
 It appears that these questions are being considered at the same time and some time to 
reinforce each other, such as: (1) “the building is probably stable,” (2), “I have no confidence 
in my technical strategies,” and (3) “I don’t want to make a public blunder”, all of which 
reinforce a “No Action” decision. 
 An alternative perception is, (1) “the building is not stable, (2) “I have no confidence 
in my technical strategies,” and (3) “I don’t want to make a public blunder”.  These perceptions 
tend to offset each other and may account for drastic alternative strategies that avoid making 
engineering decisions.  An example is the multiple suggestions for explosive demolition at D2 
(“Should I begin expedient hazard mitigation?”) and D4 (“How do I make long-term repairs?”) 
decision points.  Such strategies eliminate the detailed engineering problem and turn the 
technical execution over to someone else as Participants C2 and C12 recommended. 
 Also of interest is that the implosion experts would be the only people on the site whose 
normal training and expertise is exactly appropriate for the strategy.  This “escape option” may 
be a powerful temptation to future decision makers as it was to participants C2 and C12.  A 
technology that can be precisely implemented during a chaotic situation could hold 
understandable appeal to a highly stressed decision maker. 
 The answer to the subordinate question, “Do experts consider several options at one 
time” is suggested by the fact that several participants listed their thoughts on decisions as 
stream of consciousness statements that were consistent with the sequential statements 
discussed above.  Also, it can be logically argued that engineers and constructors routinely 
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plan ahead and are not going to make decision D2 without a least a theoretical concept of 
technical strategies at either D3 or D4.  Thus, the answer to question “Do experts consider 
several options at one time?” is “yes.” 
 If D3 and D4 are considered before decision D1 is made, then it can be argued that 
some participants do reverse the apparent order of the decisions.  This idea that individuals 
back into the decision is further supported by the observation that, of 29 participants, not a 
single one answered yes to D1 and then failed to present either expedient mitigation options or 
the implosion strategy at D3 and D4.  All three participants, E12, C11, and C12, who did not 
list ideas for mitigation opted for “no action” at D1 or implosion at D2. It appears that 
participants search for ideas first, and then make the D1 decision, or perhaps return to it and 
reverse the decision.  It should be recognized, however, that the inverse does not hold true.  
The availability of a large number of mitigation ideas does not automatically mean that the 
participant will employ any of them, and answer “yes” at D3.  Several participants identified 
multiple strategies, but took no action.  They either believed the building to be capable of 
surviving the storm, believed time was insufficient, or showed fear of personal or firm 
accountability and answered no to initiating action at D1 as discussed in Strategy 1.  It cannot 
be argued that they thought of the mitigation ideas too late because the exercise was 
specifically constructed to allow them to backtrack and correct a decision if they wished.  Such 
backtracking was clearly identified by the changing of participants’ pen colors at specified 
intervals. 
 In summary, the answer to the subordinate question, “Do some individuals reverse the 
order of the decision?” is “yes.” 
 
7.3  Discussion of the Effects of Different Expertise 
 Question 1:  How can experienced construction personnel contribute to the strategy? 
 Discussion: Table 6 compares issues that engineers and constructors identified as 
Initial Key Actions.  Constructors responded more strongly than engineers, (a difference of 
18%+) on four of the thirteen critical key actions. These are (1) early mobilization of steel 
constructors (2) reviewing floor loading in damaged areas (3) immediately organizing a 
damage assessment and (4) monitoring the evolving condition of the severed column and the 
adjacent cracked girder.  The strongest difference was in the constructor’s approach to damage 
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assessment, where 71% of constructors identified a need for an organized damage assessment 
while only 53% of engineers did so.  This is critical because the engineers generally preferred 
a personal observation of the damage.  Yet touring an entire building searching out damage 
may not be practical or wise.  An organized team search to find specific damage and access 
routes for engineering visits would appear to be an efficient alternative.  Incidentally, 
constructors also took greater immediate responsibility for evacuating and controlling the work 
area, which is consistent with their normal responsibilities at a work site.  Such action would 
have to coordinate with fire department responsibilities. 
 A comparison of engineers’ and constructors’ responses to identify expedient 
mitigation options showed engineers with a greater awareness of structural strategies for the 
five basic options except for constructors exhibiting a marginally (9%) greater awareness of 
reducing wind load on the building by removing windows.  Overall, the engineers identified 
38 options to the constructors 28. 
 In secondary options, the constructors did express greater concern about the weight of 
debris in the damaged portion of the building and the removal of it.  This concern is consistent 
with their estimating floor loading as a key action.  Again, these responses are logically tied to 
a constructor’s responsibility for floor loadings during construction and renovation of 
buildings. 
 The constructors also showed a greater awareness of the availability of implosion in 
case immediate removal of the building was desired.  However, it should be noted that a greater 
percentage of them (86% of constructors vs. 66% of engineers) felt that the building could not 
survive the storm.  This could result in more thought by this group on alternative strategies 
(implosion). 
 In the category of structural estimates, the constructors showed significantly lower 
estimates of fatal wind speeds, believed the risk of collapse in 24 hours to be greater than did 
the engineers, called for greater evacuation radii and believed domino failure posed a greater 
risk. More constructors (86%) than engineers (66%) believed the building will collapse in a 50 
mile an hour wind. 
 In the use of government resources, six constructors suggested using government 
assistance in transporting personnel and providing emergency services compared to only two 
engineers.  
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 In the areas of concern for legal liability (Tables 7 and 10) constructors showed slightly 
higher levels of concern than engineers did (Table 8 differences were minor).  However, this 
concern reversed when the issue was presented as one of cancellation of liability insurance. In 
that situation, 86% of engineers would withdraw their services as compared to 64% of 
constructors. The overall message appears to be that constructors are not going to be any more 
constrained by liability issues than engineers would be.  That is, we can infer that whatever 
liability protection the engineers require is probably going to satisfy the constructors. 
 The time needed for engineering calculations and document preparation is not very 
relevant to the constructor’s role because they would not be performing this service. It can be 
noted, however, that the average constructor estimated the time to properly prepare documents 
for repair to be 2.5 days, which is quite similar to the engineers’ estimate of 2.7 days.  From 
this we could infer that the constructors have a similar understanding of what is required to 
assess the damage and prepare the documents. 
 Summary: As noted in Question 1 of the normative model, constructors appear to have 
stronger responses in areas that are visually evident and reinforced by their own experiences.  
Thus, they are more responsive to visibly cracked columns, debris loading of floors, and 
damage assessment.  Constructors also seemed to see the issue as part of a team response to 
the problem, whereas almost every engineer saw the assessment of the damage to be a matter 
of personal observation.  In short, constructors advocated organizing the site quickly.  Also, 
constructors were more resistant to legal stress than engineers.  In a very high stakes game, 
maintaining focus throughout distractions will be important. 
 
7.4  Discussion of Various Levels of Experience and Expertise 
 There is a tendency to subgroup individuals within a given group by experience.  It is 
a basic, intuitive and tested assumption that a given individual who has performed a complex 
task repeatedly will significantly improve his performance of that task.  Therefore, repeated 
practice on identical threshold tasks (testing) to gain admittance to a professional group assures 
that, for certain predetermined problems, the group will respond consistently within certain 
parameters or boundaries.  In this case, civil engineering degrees and licensing provide these 
identical group tasks and the traditional boundary of civil engineering is understood to be 
structural failure.  Crossing that boundary is a serious professional issue. 
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 Moving beyond this textbook threshold shared by the group, the practice of engineering 
divides into various specialties.  The elite civil engineers that become high-rise designers join 
one of a handful of specialized offices in the U.S. or abroad.  Designers often become narrowly 
focused and highly specialized.  Although the field is constantly experimenting with new 
concepts and materials, professional communication through professional publications, peer 
reviewed journals and continuing education assure a reasonable homogeneity in outlook and 
approach to problems.  At some point in this process, the term “experienced engineer” may 
begin to be equated with “high-rise expert.”  If these experts with decades of experience are 
given a traditional engineering problem, there may be some range to the answers based on 
personal engineering philosophy, but ultimately most answers will be tightly grouped and show 
consistency in approach and results. 
 However, when the design problem begins with multiple failures of members, unknown 
overstressing of the remaining frame, and eccentric redistribution of loading, their problem 
has, from the outset, moved beyond the defined boundaries of structural engineering. The 
entire pre-determined mathematical topography that engineering depends upon is thrown into 
confusion.  A partially collapsed building is a mathematical tornado beyond the comfortably 
gridded topographical Kansas of new building mechanics.  As one participant remarked, “It’s 
like finding yourself in another world.  You not only don’t know how to get out, you don’t 
even know where you are.”  This confusion outside the conventional boundaries of engineering 
was clearly shown in the extreme variations of the routine questions concerning wind speed 
for collapse (Table 11), the risk of collapse in 24 hours (Table 12) and the time required to 
provide analysis for temporary repairs (Table 15).  The basic tenet of engineering that these 
questions should have produced a tightly grouped set of answers from engineers is nowhere to 
be found.  It is apparent that the damage to the structural frame has produced a disorienting 
confusion about expedient hazard mitigation. 
 This confusion suggests a quandary.  The traditional definition of a structural 
engineering expert is a thorough knowledge of the mapped and explored mathematical 
topography. However, once the tasks move beyond the pre-determined answers of textbooks 
and the routine of an engineering office, the definition of expert becomes more vague.  Is an 
expert of unexplored terrain the individual who simply knows the most about the adjoining 
mathematical landscape and in his experience has perhaps caught an intuitive glimpse of the 
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adjoining unknown?  Or should he be some sort of explorer who is pre-equipped to launch into 
this suddenly created unknown on a moment’s notice, with a planned agenda to roughly but 
quickly map the new territory?  Can broad generalizations and assumptions for computer 
generated programming serve where there is a lack of time for the painstaking scientific 
research that is the foundation of traditional engineering? Or, perhaps, a combination of 
approaches is required in this strange new land if the twenty-first century means we are no 
longer in Kansas. 
 Further confounding our rigorously trained participants finding themselves in an 
unknown mathematical land is a strange rabbit hole that suddenly plummets to a legal 
landscape completely beyond the familiar comfort of mathematical logic.  Their careers, their 
firms, and possibly their lives suddenly become subject to rules, laws and precedents for which 
they have had little training or experience. 
 The engineers’ level of concern about legal liability had dropped radically to the point 
that 100% expressed no concern.  Most importantly, they were still giving advice and no one 
had walked away.  This calmness changed radically in Table 16 when they were informed that 
their firm’s liability insurance had been cancelled.  The percentage of engineers expressing “no 
concern” dropped from 100% to 0% and no less than 87% of the fifteen engineers required 
immediate releases or completely deferred decision making to others who were not on site. 
The experienced engineers were also heavily impacted.  The actual loss of liability coverage 
produced major differences among the engineering participants with each of the four 
alternatives to “no concern” having at least one endorsement and suggested some lack of 
confidence in their engineering positions.  Constructors responded with 79% requiring releases 
or deferring although 21% (3) continued to express no concern.  Although the results from 
initial questions (Tables 7, 8 and 10) concerning legal risks to the engineers and constructors 
show that these professionals consistently put service to the architectural and construction 
community ahead of risk to themselves, the results from Table 16, delay for cancelled liability 
insurance, provide strong evidence that specific government intervention might be needed to 
provide an umbrella coverage for experts acting in good faith in emergencies.  This need is 
further emphasized by the divergence of opinion for immediate actions and mitigation 
strategies. 
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 Summary: Overall, experience bodes well for reducing extreme concern and focusing 
on the issues at hand.  The more experienced participants showed less radical judgment to both 
structural risks and legal concerns.  These two areas are important for avoiding expensive and 
time-consuming overreaction to the dangers and keeping professionals on the job for timely 
repairs.  However, in the matter of laying out courses of action in emergency assessment of the 
problem and in expedient mitigation strategies, there may be evidence of a tendency for experts 
to bring previous experience to the problem without a broad survey of the possibilities.  This 
evidence shows up in fewer alternatives listed by the more experienced and educated 
individuals.  In Table 19, participants with 11 to 20 years’ experience outperformed more 
experienced individuals in 10 of 11 repair categories. The counter argument that the latter have 
just intuitively eliminated impractical alternatives is questionable because these experts 
themselves list different alternatives, i.e., each lists favorites without identifying strategies that 
others are listing, even though alternatives are specifically requested.  Disagreement among 
these experts as to the best strategy is prima facie evidence that a broader review could be 
hugely beneficial.  While it can be argued that because this exercise is very time pressured, an 
early instinctive strategy may be justified in the face of a complete lack of planning.  However, 
a few hours to widen the options may also be wise.  As discussed earlier, the participants in the 
exercise identified two separate engineering problems, the overall wind loading and the further 
deterioration of the local damage with building movement.  If improvised strategies are 
required, all portions of the problem should be identified and addressed - which was not 
accomplished by the participants.  There is a clear need for a pre-planned agenda and concepts 
similar to medical triage may result. 
Assuming the engineers are correct that they need to personally observe areas of severe 
damage, it would seem logical to use a team, as suggested by the constructors, to identify areas 
of damage and guide the evaluating engineer to the various sites in the building.  The logical 
personnel for such a team would be construction personnel who would know from experience 
the appropriate appearance of various structural members and connections.  This concept 
would free the engineers for specific and critical tasks that only they can perform.  Meanwhile, 
the constructors are gaining firsthand knowledge of the problems and the opportunity for 
understanding the engineers’ perceptions of the problems.  Other issues such as the floor 
loading, debris removal, and mobilization of steel constructors would naturally integrate into 
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this process.  As far as a possible disruption to the process, constructors showed even less 
concern about liability than engineers (Table 16). 
 
7.4.1  Effects of Expertise 
 These questions explore the difference in answers that would be obtained by emergency 
personnel depending on the quantity of education and/or experience of the individuals whom 
they enlist for help. 
 Question 1: How do answers from more experienced engineers and constructors differ 
from the less experienced? 
 For this question, we will review Table 6, the number of Participants Taking Initial 
Emergency Assessment and Incident Management Actions, as well as responses to the 
questions in Section 3 of the questionnaire. 
 The results in Table 6 show education to be related to an awareness for the need of 
documents (A2).  However, other issues do not show differences across education levels (A1, 
A3, A4, A5, A7, A8, A10, A11 and A12).  For experience, there were small differences, except 
for more experienced participants seeing a greater need to conduct a damage assessment.  The 
apparent education correlation for A2 might be due to the fact that the engineers are much 
more highly educated and the constructors are more field-oriented.  However, the differences 
on A11 between professions do not have corresponding differences between education levels, 
which suggests profession is the determining variable. 
 Table 15 shows the time that participants believe would be required to prepare 
documents or sketches to begin expedient hazard mitigation actions.  This table indicates broad 
disagreement about the requirements to begin repair.  The exact question in the exercise is 
“How much time would it take to properly analyze the structural condition of the building for 
temporary repairs?”  The full range of answers exceeded the table scale on both ends, ranging 
from a few hours to weeks.  The scale on the table was from one to five days or more.  The 
experienced engineers estimated the fastest time for analysis, a mean response of 1.8 days.  
Their actual estimates are somewhat shorter since two estimated a few hours that translated to 
a minimum of one day.  If we adjust these “off scale” estimates, the mean rating drops slightly 
to 1.55 days.  Of further interest is the fact that four of these five experienced participants are 
executives.  The mean of the executive estimates is only .68 day or about 16.5 hours to run 
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calculation and prepare sketches to begin repairs.  This answer begs the question of the 
definition of expertise and would imply that the issue is as much about one of management 
position as one of experience.  
 
7.5  Ultimate Goals 
7.5.1  Task 1:  Mobilize the Resources for Emergency Assessment 
 The exercise revealed that the respondents varied in their approaches to the problem.  
No one participant provided a complete analysis or identified all of the actions presented in 
Figure 7.  This suggests the actions considered and implemented in an actual emergency would 
vary substantially depending upon who received the call to report to the site.  It also implies 
that valuable time could be wasted in discussing alternative options and selecting the best one.  
However, when answers from all of the participants are reviewed, a “best combination” of 
action emerges.  The options comprising this composite strategy were listed in Figure 7 and 
Table 6 and are discussed in more detail below: 
  
Initial Response for Emergency Assessment 
1. Visit the site as soon as possible with necessary safety equipment, available building 
construction drawings, a camera, binoculars, cell phones, quality photo transmission 
equipment and appropriate computers.  Staff the site in two steps.  The first step is to 
put the decision maker on site with the basic observation and communication tools.  
The second step is for a staff member to follow with documents and equipment 
including structural drawings, architectural drawings, fax machines, etc. and any other 
relevant support. 
2. Locate and obtain a full set of construction drawings with revisions and have them 
delivered to the site.  Many high rises are currently in business contracts with 
engineering firms other than the original designers.  In some cases, the original 
designers are long since retired and the firm sold or shuttered. This may require the 
assignment of an individual to specifically locate complete structural sets and transport 
them to the site, a process that could take several hours complete.  The problem is 
exacerbated because many owners primarily use architectural and mechanical sets for 
the routine renovations, build-outs, and other “churn” in the building.  The only time a 
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structural drawing is required is for unusually heavy floor loadings, stairs between 
floors, or clearance studies for air conditioning ducts.  On the rare occasion when the 
use of a structural drawing is required, the collateral result is the loss of the drawing 
when it is loaned out for the immediate project and not returned.  Thus, neither the 
original engineers nor the owner may have a complete set of structural drawings in an 
emergency.  After all, as one participant noted in this exercise, “Who ever heard of a 
structural emergency in a high-rise that required drawings?” 
3. Determine the firm’s Incident Commander (IC).  Notifying the firm’s senior executives 
of the situation will trigger an internal discussion as to who will control the firm’s 
decision making at the building site.  “Who is in charge” is a perennial problem.  Select 
a “duty officer” and designated back-ups of succession to the position.  Define the duty 
officer’s scope of authority.  Failure to address this issue is a potential source of delay 
and is an area in which prior emergency response planning would be valuable.  If an 
emergency response plan is not available, then much of the organization and action 
described in this list will have to be improvised by the executives during the crisis or 
at least have their tacit approval.  Unfortunately, this study has shown that at least four 
individuals were required to identify the majority of these recommended key initial 
actions.  Also, an incident that occurred on a Sunday afternoon, as in the exercise 
scenario, would complicate matters and extend the time necessary to locate the 
individuals that might normally take charge.  There are two probable outcomes to this 
situation.  First, the firm takes no action until most responsibilities are finally decided 
upon, in which case there is little or no action in the first several hours. This could 
include the failure to rapidly mobilize the firm and supporting constructors.  Second, 
the firm empowers the first professionals contacted to take charge of initial assessment 
and preliminary mobilization. The firm may choose to replace this initial IC with more 
qualified individuals as they are located.  The advantage of this second option is that a 
significant amount of time could be saved.  Mobilizing a team and activating 
facilities/equipment can take place in parallel with the identification of the company 
IC.  Thus, all assets are available when the company IC arrives at the incident scene. 
The disadvantage could be a greater initial risk incurred by the firm, likely by an 
individual who may not be a specialist or is not a partner and does not share the 
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economic cost resulting from large mistakes or legal action. Expedient hazard 
mitigation of a crippled building requires efficient mobilization of all decision makers 
and critical skillsets to the building.  In this case, an engineering firm would likely be 
incurring risk to itself in a manner that is difficult for the partners to justify except as a 
noble public service.   When it is taken into consideration that engineering is normally 
a risk-averse profession, and that even a single failure is avoided at all costs, a rapid, 
possibly instinctive response to a massive problem is inconsistent to all engineering 
education, training, and experience. The remarkable result of this exercise is the large 
percentage of individuals, including executives, who were willing to rush into the 
breach, and when challenged with legal issues by the scenario, maintained a steadfast 
determination to assist until professional liability insurance itself was cancelled.  There 
were even unsolicited references to public responsibility and placing the needs of 
society ahead of personal risk.  The great question raised and unanswered in this 
exercise is the effect of group decision-making.   Would an engineering or construction 
firm as a group show the same risk taking proclivity as was seen in this exercise?  If 
group decision-making is more risk averse, then the notification of firm executives 
could result in a smaller group of expedient mitigation strategies than recorded here.  
Again, pre-planning an emergency response organization not only appears to be 
effective, but is consistent with the engineering predilection for methodical approaches 
to problems.  
4. Identify the engineering team and initiate their notification.  This organization may be 
two-fold, one team at the disaster site (Incident Command Post) and a subordinate team 
at the engineering firm’s office (Emergency Operations Center).  The exact 
composition of the organization may vary with the nature of the damage, the danger at 
the site, the practicality of running engineering analysis programs at the site on laptops, 
the location of the structural drawings and the availability of needed communication 
links and peripheral devices such as scanners and large printers.  Another factor is the 
distance between the site and the engineering offices.   It is not inconceivable that one 
could be in the central business district of a city and the other in a suburb or even that 
the two of them are in different cities.  The initial organizational issues related to 
locating individuals were discussed in Item 3 above.   It also must be remembered that 
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the engineers as well as the constructors are probably already fully engaged with other 
projects.  In the exercise, all participants seem to assume that their existing work would 
be subordinated to an emergency such as a critically damaged high rise. If this is true 
then the organization may simply follow the lead of decision makers rushing to the site 
If the key managers appear on site, there may be a greater tendency to set up most 
operations at or near the impacted building.   Again, prior emergency response planning 
could lead to more efficient and well thought out approaches to staffing the emergency 
response organization. 
5. Identify general and steel constructors and mobilize their managers to the site because 
both general and structural steel constructors will be required.  Steel fabricating shops 
will also require notification but would normally be contracted by the steel 
subcontractor.  Mechanical, electrical, and plumbing (MEP) subcontractors will 
normally have blanket maintenance contracts with the owner or the owner’s 
management company.  The emergency response plan should indicate that these MEP 
subcontractors will be notified by the building manager.  Both the electricians and 
plumbers should be mobilized to the site immediately to deal with electrical and water 
damage as well as fire sprinklers.  In addition, they may require reassurance from the 
structural team.  All constructors would be contracted on a time and material basis. 
Assuming normal professional and working relationships, the initial mobilization 
would be done on verbal orders to be followed up by the various purchasing and 
accounting groups on the next workday.  If there was a complication to these business 
relationships, in particular if the building owner was known to be in financial straits or 
bankruptcy, it might not be possible to mobilize for expedient hazard mitigation as 
there is no legal means to force constructors or for that matter, engineering firms to 
assist.  In that case, it could be days before an effective response is launched.  
6. Identify surveyors and mobilize them to site immediately.  One of the first pieces of 
information that will be required to determine the status of the building is its verticality.  
Severe damage such as shown in this exercise can induce a building to  a lean in the 
direction of the damaged side.  The increased gravity loading on the columns on that 
side is the P-Delta lever effect discussed earlier.  In addition to increasing gravity 
loading on the damaged side, the building will almost certainly increase its wind 
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movement.  This also increases the P-Delta lever as well as actual wind stress in the 
frame.  Highly competent surveyors will be required to determine both the lean of the 
building and its movement.  A close working relation between the engineers and the 
surveyors will probably be required to assure accurate interpretation of the 
measurements.  It is very likely that some improvisation may be necessary due to the 
damaged condition of the building. This information is critical in understanding the 
remaining strength of the building and its response to wind loading.  Also, by 
measuring the existing wind loading and the resulting movement, some projections of 
movement in higher wind speeds can be roughly projected. 
7. Initiate a request for legal support from the engineering firm’s and the general 
constructor’s attorneys.  While the initial thrust will be in contracts and construction 
law, other legal specialties, such as environmental, will also be drawn into the melee - 
the scope of which is outside the bounds of this study.  However, there is one goal on 
which the emergency manager must focus.  That, stated quite simply, is to keep the 
engineers and constructors on the job and avoid a shutdown over liability issues.  This 
exercise showed the willingness of the engineers and their executives, as well as the 
general constructors and their executives, to aggressively take on this problem in a 
hypothetical exercise.  The one and only issue that finally daunted some participants 
was the prospect of exposing their firm to unprotected legal liability.  This almost 
certainly would require immediate and aggressive government intervention.  
8. Initiate contact with the client’s executives and their insurance company, because the 
ultimate loss will be the client’s.  For this reason, the engineer and general constructor 
should establish clear lines of communication for major decisions.  Because of the 
complexity of the issue, it is unlikely that the owner or his insurance company would 
interfere in most decisions short of implosion. However it is obvious that keeping them 
informed of the building’s condition and possible additional damage necessitated by 
emergency repairs may reduce the likelihood of post-incident litigation. In most cases, 
the building manager or the management company will provide much of this interface 
and actually make the contacts and set up meetings if necessary.  
9. Initiate contact with law enforcement representatives.  Local law enforcement may 
defer to the FBI in this case.  However, there have been notorious incidents where the 
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two law enforcement groups clashed on crime sites, one of which was the 1993 WTC 
incident.  In that case, the FBI threatened to arrest local New York Police Department 
detectives and forced them from the site.  The lesson is that law enforcement controls 
the site under their authority over crime scenes, so the engineering and emergency 
management personnel should be prepared to make a powerful and well-presented case 
for their activities on site.  It is important to recognize that many FBI agents are lawyers 
and do not bluff easily. They will protect the integrity of the crime scene at all costs.  It 
is very likely that the only argument that will gain access to the damaged column is the 
threat that building deterioration or collapse will destroy the crime scene.  It must also 
be remembered that there has never been a high rise incident in which an effort was 
made to save the building from total destruction and that the devastating domino model 
is generally unknown (although readily understandable even by those without 
architectural, engineering or construction expertise).  All of these ideas will have to be 
explained effectively and succinctly. 
10. Plan an initial meeting with the entire emergency response organization.  This meeting 
is primarily to get decision makers together with the general constructor and all 
subcontractor managers and supervisors.  The purpose of the meeting is to identify 
players and devise an incident action plan.  As noted earlier, the players would also 
include surveyors, building management, and law enforcement representatives.  One 
important function of the latter would be to explain the crime scene site protocol that 
everyone must understand.  Lawyers and insurance company representatives may or 
may not be present depending on circumstances and relationships. 
11. Initiate a floor loading and condition review of the damaged floors.  Like the survey 
information this is basic information that will determine access to the most severely 
damaged area so emergency assessments can be performed.  This work could probably 
be done by experienced steelworker supervisors or engineers. 
12. Initiate a rapid but systematic survey of damage to the building structure by a team of 
engineers and steelworkers. This survey should be planned to be completed in hours, 
not days, so multiple teams might be necessary.  Photos should be taken of the damage 
so floor and column lines can be clearly identified and their locations confirmed. If 
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there is a potential for progressive failure due to wind movement, either live or TV 
observation of the area should be immediately instituted. 
 The purpose of these actions is to furnish critical engineering data for use in 
determining the level of damage to the wind frame, any gravity loading issues such as debris 
or P-Delta shifts, or progressive failures leading to greater risks.  From this information, the 
engineers will make the major decisions concerning temporary bracing, reduction of wind 
loading, and emergency repairs of damaged connections. 
 
7.5.1.1 Temporary Mitigation Measures for Rigid Steel Frame 
 This exercise identified a number of expedient mitigation measures that can be used to 
stabilize a rigid steel framed building.  These are: 
1. Repair, raise as possible, and reconnect severed columns after checking any increased 
loading of adjacent columns caused by the pure tension action of failed wind beams.  
Reinforce damaged connections and brace deep girders. 
2. Add X or K bracing to the damaged wind frame by welding or temporary cabling. 
Remove windows and interior partitions to reduce wind loading on upper floors of the 
building. 
3. Install shoring under damaged floors to reduce the chance of collapse. 
4. Weld/shore damaged wind beams if feasible. 
5. Increase the capacity of overloaded columns adjacent to the damage. 
6. Remove debris where feasible. 
7. Review the option of implosion if necessary. 
 The actions listed above are believed to be the most practical of the options that 
participants listed for expedient mitigation.  Two other options were explored by participants 
and listed in Tables 3 and 4, but were not included in final strategies due to lack of time for 
implementation or technical difficulties.  These strategies or combinations were used in the 
decision flow charts for Strategies 3 through 8 and can be viewed as an actual checklist for an 
event such as the scenario for this exercise. 
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7.5.2  Task 2:  Team Organization for Expedient Hazard Mitigation Operations 
 All steel framed high-rise buildings suffering a crippling blow are going to require 
basically the same response for expedient mitigation decisions.  Collectively, the engineers 
and constructors have outlined a response that includes the following as a minimum:  an 
engineering team, a construction team with a general contractor, a steel subcontractor(s), a 
steel fabricator, an electrician, a surveying team, and a materials testing company.  This team 
will involve a minimum of fifteen people plus the actual skilled labor required for repairing 
the building.  The labor force could be from twenty to two hundred workers at any given time 
(see Figure 8 for team composition for external impacts on the engineering decision maker). 
 One of the central problems of expedient hazard mitigation for a steel framed high-rise 
building is the responsibility that falls on a single individual to make the D1 decision to react 
to the initial events and initiate mobilization.  Although the key decision has been discussed 
from an engineering perspective, it is actually a safety decision by the building owner.  There 
is a need for an initial financial commitment that will cause confusion and delay if the owner 
is not immediately approached with rational and solid business reasons for any expedient 
mitigation actions.  It is a major impediment to expedient hazard mitigation and must be 
addressed. 
 If the average cost per worker is $150.00 an hour and an hourly average of 100 workers 
are committed for 48 hours, the total labor cost is $730,000 for this cost category alone.  A tool 
and material cost of one-third of that amount is normal, resulting in a total of approximately 
$1,000,000 for the expedient mitigation effort.  This is not a decision that can be made by a 
building manager, who is likely to be the individual who initiates the engineering response.  
However, even if only two buildings collapse, a total loss of over a billion dollars is not 
unlikely.  Indeed, the loss of WTC 7 alone was that amount. Thus, the expenditure is in a ratio 
of one dollar spent to save $1,000.  This estimate of $1 million for expedient hazard mitigation 
does not include the cost of permanent repairs that could run well beyond one hundred million 
dollars.  Even so, the savings would still approach a billion dollars.  While we can assume that 
this ratio is acceptable to most CFOs, providing the detailed argument to proceed in a format 
satisfactory to the financial decision maker is an undertaking that may require a concentrated 
professional effort in several fields.  One of the early lessons most business bureaucrats learn 
is to never rush into a decision. This maxim can and probably will backfire in a fast-moving, 
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high-risk situation such as described in this exercise.  The strategies for resolving this decision-
making dilemma will require advance planning and education of owners or, more practically, 
firm government intervention.  Unfortunately, the government agencies that have historically 
had some responsibility in this area show no awareness of the issue.  The government thinks 
of a repair response in weeks, when hours may be required to save the building.  As is too often 
the case, planning will be dictated by bitter experience.  It appears difficult at this point to 
avoid a possibly fatal paralysis in expedient decision-making such as occurred at the WTC in 
2001. 
 
7.5.3    Task 3:  Adjustments to the Decision Model 
 Although the normative decision model appears to be valid, there are three areas where 
adjustments are warranted. 
 First are the D1 and D2 decisions, which are a combination of engineering and financial 
choices.  Once the engineering decision maker(s) determine D1 and D2, they must convince 
the owner or government agencies of the wisdom of the selected expedient mitigation actions 
and gain approval for the financial commitment that accompanies the decision to implement 
one or more of them. Therefore, the expediency of these decisions is absolutely controlled by 
the owner of the building, his insurance company and/or government entities with available 
funding.  The engineer’s role is one of gaining authorization to begin the process of 
mobilization and implementation.  The normative model could be adjusted to show the outside 
control of the decision and reflect the accompanying process. 
 Second is the mobilization of constructors and support personnel starting at the D2 
decision point.  This is too complex a matter for engineers to effectively organize on site while 
performing their primary role of making engineering design decisions. The actual mobilization 
should be largely predetermined and triggered by the D2, D3 and D4 decisions and patterned 
to fit each action with conditional adjustments determined by constructions managers on site.  
Thus, entirely different specialists, subcontractors, and materials lists might be called upon 
depending on the direction of each decision.  The constructor’s mobilization point could be 
reflected in an adjunct to the flow diagram with details of who is mobilized down each decision 
path. 
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 Third, Strategy 7 terminated in one case with the building surviving without 
intervention, but then being demolished.  This was not anticipated and should be added to the 
chart. 
 
7.5.4    Task 4: Identify Critical Engineering Programs for Analysis of Damaged Structure 
 One of the most important issues identified in this exercise is the lack of a specific 
approach for programming computer strategies to this problem.  As discussed earlier, the 
participants in the exercise did not identify any specific pre-programming for the structural 
assessment of the building.  They did, however, repeatedly refer to using engineering 
programs.  The underlying issue was a lack of concept of how to move forward with the 
analysis.  This problem was discussed in Section 6.4.3 where it was noted that structural 
engineering is a mathematical topography with a known landscape.  A damaged building is 
outside the boundaries of that well-established discipline.  Therefore, the most basic principles 
of an approach to such a problem for expedient mitigation are either not established or at least 
at not being taught in our schools of engineering.  The development of such a program is a key 
requirement of expedient hazard mitigation and its development should be a cornerstone for 
an effective response to the imminent failure of a steel framed high-rise structure. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1       Concluding the Proposed Decision Flow Chart 
 The Decision Flow Chart for Expedient Hazard Mitigation appears to be accurate, but 
deserves additional detail.  First is a financial control module for initial engineering decisions 
D1 and D2 that estimates the cost of the engagement of the engineers and technicians to survey 
the problem.  This is followed by the costs of mobilization of construction personnel for the 
actual repair.  The owner and his insurance company exert this control initially, although 
government agencies, such as DHS, FEMA, USACE, and NIST, might have long-term 
involvement.  The engineer at this early stage is primarily an advocate for financial 
mobilization to accomplish the goals of expedient mitigation.  For the scenario in this study, 
the two day cost of an effective response appear to be at least a million dollars, assuming the 
mobilization of two to four hundred skilled trades (e.g. welders, construction managers, 
surveyors, engineers and other specialists). 
 Second, the efficient mobilization of these personnel and consultants for expedient 
mitigation requires pre-planning and should be tied to individual decision points at D1, D2 and 
D3.  Mobilization management should be a partnership between engineers and constructors 
(the latter are actually better equipped for the task). 
 The responses identified in the flow charts for Strategies 1 through 8 (Figures 10-17) 
by participants in the exercise produced five different strategies to the expedient mitigation 
problem (the additional three charts reflect varying approximations to permanent strategies). 
Engineers chose four of the five strategies.  The fifth was chosen by a single constructor.  This 
difference reflected divergent opinions among participants as to the condition of the building 
and even which aspect of the problem required attention.  This divergence was grounded in a 
lack of a single coherent approach to calculate the strength of the damaged building or the 
circumstances and consequences of this failure.  Further confirmation of this lack of consensus 
on a strategy was the variance in judgments about the lateral strength of the damaged building, 
from less than 40 mph to over 80 mph (see Table 11).  Table 12 further emphasized this 
dissension where opinions on the likelihood of total collapse within 24 hours varied from 0% 
to 50%, even among the engineers with 20 or more years of experience.  Other data reflected 
this disagreement and engineers’ estimates of time to “properly analyze” the building for 
expedient mitigation varied from hours to over a week. There was no evidence of 
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misunderstanding the problem or the questions.  However, there was strong evidence of a lack 
of a single coherent approach to the calculations (assessment of the problem) even though the 
damage was clearly visible and explained in writing with a complete set of plans for reference.  
Strategies for expedient mitigation were further scattered by questions concerning legal 
liability and possible loss of professional liability insurance.  All of these factors combined to 
produce the variations of eight strategies shown on the flow diagrams.   
 These results have two implications.  First, the engineering discipline as a whole is very 
inconsistent in such a scenario.  Even the most experienced engineers and executives disagreed 
on how to proceed, which might lead to over-reaction in the case of a scenario similar to this 
exercise.  In any event, such disagreement will almost certainly delay the initiation of 
mitigation action.  In turn, such delay is likely to decrease the probability of successfully 
stabilizing the damaged building. Emergency management personnel, faced with wildly 
varying opinions from engineers, will probably err on the side of safety and evacuate large 
areas of the Central Business District.  The over-reaction could lead to tens of thousands of 
workers in some of our largest, most prestigious companies and professional firms being forced 
out of their offices.  This evacuation will be exacerbated by the lack of planning for expedient 
mitigation and the building may be left unstable for many days or weeks.  In an extreme 
situation, hundreds of thousands of work-hours could be lost, because the number of work 
hours lost increases exponentially with the radius of the evacuated area. (See Figure 18). 
 However, the ultimate issue is much greater.  The compromising of high-rises as power 
symbols and secure bastions of American business could lead to the abandonment of the 
architectural form. A few companies have already abandoned the Central Business Districts 
for “campus” environments on the outskirts of our cities. Moreover, an unknown portion of 
the workforce is uncomfortable in high-rises at the present time.  At which point does lost 
work, a primal fear of heights, and a shrinking workforce willing to work above the ground 
drive a company to seek lodging elsewhere?   
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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 3 Blocks 
48 9 10 11 12 13 32 2 Blocks (Recommended) 
47 24 1 2 3 14 33 1 Block 
46 23 8 X 4 15 34 Subject Building 
45 22 7 6 5 16 35  
44 21 20 19 18 17 36  
43 42 41 40 39 38 37  
  
Figure 18 - Theoretical Grid Showing Buildings Impacted by Evacuation Orders. D2 
Decision Recommendation to Incident Commander, Evacuation Radius – Costs. The 
number of blocks impacted by an evacuation order of 1, 2, or 3 blocks in addition to 
subject building. 
 
 One Block Evacuation Clears 8 Blocks 
 Two Block Evacuation Clears 24 Additional Blocks (Table 15) 
 Three Block Evacuation Clears Additional 48 Blocks 
 
If a high-rise district houses an average of 1,000 people per block, then a two block 
evacuation called for by the average engineering participant will clear 24 blocks in 
addition to the subject building.  Thus, 24 x 1,000 = 24,000 personnel evacuated for 
one week = 24,000 x 40 hours = 960,000 hours or approximately one million labor 
hours lost each week.  Assuming employee cost in a typical high-rise building is $50 
an hour, the loss is $50,000,000 a week from evacuation costs alone.  These estimates 
are very conservative for a major Central Business District. 
 
What happens to a city whose high-rises no longer have a value as real-estate?  What happens 
to a country whose power symbols are violated beyond use? 
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8.2       Conclusions 
 The results of this exercise support several conclusions and participants’ responses 
have suggested some areas for future discussion: 
1. Engineers are less likely than constructors to recommend immediate implosion, 
presumably because their education gives them greater understanding of the inherent 
strength of the building. (Emergency Assessment) 
2. Greater education may reduce the likelihood of unjustified extreme reactions to an 
emergency. (Emergency Assessment) 
3. There is evidence that even top experts do not explore all the available options.  A 
protocol to encourage full exploration of options is needed, such as a team approach 
to the problem, by laying out more ideas for action and options for strategies. (Hazard 
Operations) 
4. There also appear to be great advantages in a team approach to evaluating the damage 
to the building.  The constructors intuitively move in directions that did not occur to 
engineers, such as immediate movement of surveyors to the site.  Introduction of team 
engineering expertise may also help reduce extreme reactions. (Emergency 
Assessment) 
5. Executives show a more consistent decision method and results than working 
professionals. (Incident Management) 
6. Pre-event research into specific repair concepts for emergency use may greatly reduce 
repair time and assist decision making in an emergency. (Hazard Operations) 
7. There was absolute agreement among all participants to take control at the site and not 
remotely. (Emergency Assessment) 
8. Locating and assembling structural documents of record may be a serious problem. 
(Emergency Assessment and Hazard Operations) 
9. Most participants showed a great moral commitment to assist in such a situation, even 
in the face of reminders of their personal and corporate liability risks (Incident 
Management). 
10. The threat of cancellation of insurance for professional liability can stop the job if 
other protection is not immediately provided. (Incident Management) 
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11. There is great variation in participants’ judgments of the survival potential of the 
damaged structure.  Engineering methods to streamline this calculation are badly 
needed. (Emergency Assessment and Hazard Operations) 
12. There were no available professional resources that participants could turn to for 
assistance with this exercise. (Hazard Operations) 
13. The potential for domino failure could cause the evacuation of dozens of blocks with 
huge long-term labor costs (Figure 18). (Population Protection) 
 
8.3       Planning for a Future Incident  
 From these conclusions, several areas of planning are suggested. 
1. The engineering profession thrives on prior planning for problems, or at least the basic 
elements of problems.  Table 17 clearly showed tremendous disagreement on how to 
analyze the problem.  In this exercise, new calculation concepts were mentioned by at 
least two participants.  These and other approaches need to be explored and expanded 
prior to their need in some future emergency.  Appropriate software for analysis needs 
to be researched and concepts of likely situations developed.  Such prior planning could 
reduce the possibility of rapid evacuations of large areas caused by a lack of 
information.  But the inverse is even more important, to recognize a deteriorating 
situation in time to allow the evacuation of tens of thousands of endangered tenants in 
nearby high-rises. 
2. The issue of domino failure requires a serious review.  Professionals have widely 
varying opinions of the likelihood of a series of buildings collapsing in sequence.  Is it 
a real possibility?  If so, what can be done about it?  This issue has severe implications 
for evacuation radius (Figure 18). 
3. Response teams of qualified high-rise experts need to be identified in advance, and 
arrangements made to utilize their knowledge in a crisis.  Concepts about how such 
teams would function nationally should be explored because current emergency teams 
are not focused on high-rises.  This exercise showed substantial differences in judgment 
that could not be clearly attributed to discipline, education or experience.  On the 
other hand, the team concept should help ensure that prior experience does not lead to 
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abridgements in the decision-making process by the most experienced individuals as 
reported in previous research.  
4. The lists of key emergency assessment and incident management action items and 
expedient mitigation options need to be highly detailed for use by the response teams 
and qualified for various locations and types of structures.  This detailing is important 
even with experts because there was repeated evidence that the most experienced 
individuals tended to take shortcuts to arrive at decisions consistent with prior 
experience.  The procedures outlined in these lists will help ensure that all items receive 
at least nominal attention. This prior planning will combine with the team concept to 
further ensure some balance in the decision-making beyond snap judgments. 
5. A central repository of major high-rise plans, specifications and calculations needs to 
be established for every major city.  Surprisingly, structural plans are often incomplete 
or unavailable. 
6. Research on actual levels of American workers’ fear of high-rises needs to be initiated.  
This baseline information will be valuable in the future to understand the evolving 
business impact of damage to high-rises and plan the future or non-future of high-rises.  
If companies cannot entice skilled workers into high-rises after a future series of 
attacks, the high-rise real estate market will collapse. 
7. There is a need to establish blanket liability protection for engineers and constructors 
that can be implemented in less than an hour.  This exercise showed a great willingness 
of participants to take risks, but this one issue alone proved capable of stopping the best 
of intentions. 
8. All planning efforts need to remember that the primary issue that separates the 
production of human-initiated disasters from all others is the concept of flexibility of 
the initiation.  In a natural disaster, engineering strategies will block future 
reoccurrence of the disaster.  If well visualized, even related issues may become moot.  
In human-initiated disasters, intelligent adversaries will constantly be seeking to 
circumvent any fixed solution to the risk.  Fixed, evident solutions can be circumvented 
if the result is sufficient.  New York City’s Freedom Tower is not a solution; it is simply 
a new problem.  Its protections may be circumvented, as were the extensive security 
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measures at WTC I and II.  Secrecy of strategies for current problems may be a partial 
defense against the creation of new problems. 
If the high rise power symbols of our society are compromised, what does it mean to 
city planning?  Do the concentric rings of beltways and intersecting freeways funneling 
millions of vehicles into American Central Business Districts still make sense or does 
the corporate campus outside the city show the way for a new era of architectural 
planning. The exercise showed this scenario is capable of rendering major confusion 
and disorder in America’s Central Business Districts.  A modicum of preplanning at 
negligible cost could change the outcome in some future reality. 
9. The most extreme responses for possible collapse comes from individuals with the least 
education in high-rise engineering.  This education level is probably similar to fire 
department emergency decision makers.  The reaction by the fire department personnel 
should be explored, especially in light of the New York Fire Department response in 
WTC 7. 
10. In terms of comprehensiveness, no single individual identified even half of all of the 
solutions that the sample generated collectively. Of the major solutions, a maximum of 
66% of engineers identified any one option.  In a sample of this small size, it is difficult 
to discuss firm conclusions about the differences between engineers and constructors, 
among levels of education, and among years of experience in Tables 6 and 7.  
Nonetheless, the differences among these categories of participants are almost all 
smaller (usually much smaller) than 30%.  Consequently, decisions about expedient 
hazard mitigation in situations like this should not be improvised by a single individual 
and perhaps, not even by a small team.  Nor, as some might suppose, should it 
necessarily be composed exclusively of Ph.D. engineers with 20-plus years of 
experience (who tended to focus in on one solution).  The best outcome will require 
both advanced planning/analysis and improvisation by a large, diverse team. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Windframe – A high-rise steel frame with welded joints, designed to resist lateral forces 
such as wind. 
Windbeam – An external beam of a high-rise windframe, typically deep and relatively 
narrow, fully welded to its supporting columns.  Such beams, with their exterior columns 
comprise a rigid steel wind frame. 
Normative – Relating to anticipated “normal” responses. 
Shoring – Individual, temporary steel posts with telescoping heads that are placed under 
floors or floor beams to transfer the load to a lower level of the building.  Loads can be 
transferred through multiple floors as required for gravity loads. 
Bracing – Refers to temporary steel members or cables in an “X” or “K” pattern that 
stabilize a building against lateral loads such as winds. 
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APPENDIX A 
BUILDING PHOTOGRAPHS 
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APPENDIX B 
BUILDING LOCATION MAP 
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APPENDIX C 
NEIGHBORING BUILDING PHOTOGRAPHS 
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APPENDIX D 
SCENARIO 
CONSENT FORM 
Expedient Mitigation for a Structurally Compromised 
Tall Building:  A Decision Model for Crisis Managers 
(A Doctoral Dissertation) 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to whether 
or not to participate in this research study.  If you decide to participate in this study, this form will 
also be used to record your consent. 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study concerning decision-making by structural 
experts in a high-rise scenario.  You were selected for your knowledge of high-rise buildings.  A 
total of 24 subjects have been asked to participate in the study.  The purpose of the study is to 
furnish authoritative information to Incident Commanders and Government Emergency Managers 
about questions that could occur in certain types of high-rise building emergencies. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked questions of professional opinion that might be 
asked by the fire department incident commander, by local and state crisis managers and the 
owner of the building, as well as other concerned parties.  The questions generally do not have 
right or wrong answers, but call for professional opinions and explanations.  The questions will 
be in written form and the responses will primarily be multiple choice or a range of choices with 
some discussion questions. 
 
The study will take about two hours for the initial exercise plus one more hour several weeks later 
to explain the results to you and obtain your professional opinion about the validity of the 
information gained. 
 
What are the risks involved in this study? 
Risks associated with your participation in the study are minimal and not greater than those 
associated with daily life. 
 
What are the possible benefits of this study? 
The possible benefits of participation are understanding issues that may arise in certain 
emergencies and questions that may be asked by emergency managers. 
 
Do I have to participate? 
No.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at any 
time without our current or future relations with Texas A&M University being affected. 
 
 
 
 155 
 
 
Will I be compensated? 
A $100 honorarium will be paid on reviewing the results approximately one month after the 
questionnaire is completed. 
 
Who will know about my participation in this research study? 
This study is confidential.  The records of this study will be kept private.  No identifiers linking 
you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published, regardless of the 
report’s security classification.  Research records will be stored at Texas A&M University and 
only Gene Robertson, and Dr. Michael Lindell, will have access to the records.  The transcripts 
and questionnaires will be destroyed two years after completion of the study. 
 
Whom do I contact with questions about the research? 
You can contact Gene Robertson at (832) 287-9053 or Dr. Mike Lindell at (979) 862-3969 with 
any questions about this study. 
 
Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant? 
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program and/or the 
Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or 
questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you can contact these offices at (979) 
458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu. 
 
Signature 
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your 
satisfaction.  You will be given a copy of the consent form for your records.  By signing this 
document, you consent to participate in this study. 
 
 
Signature of Participant:    Date: _________________ 
 
Printed Name:   
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent   Date: __________ 
 
Printed Name:   
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EXERCISE GUIDE 
 
1. Sign two consent form sand remove from booklet. 
2. Provide one copy of consent form to subject 
3. Place one copy of consent form in envelope 
4. Fill out professional background 
5. Review professional background 
6. Have question list ready 
7. Provide blue pen 
8. Start clock at 0:00 
9. Have subject note time at end of Section 1 
10. Switch to red pen 
11. Provide: 
a. White photo book 
b. Green photo book 
c. Set of plans and poster 
12. Have subject note time at end of Section 2 
13. Switch to green pen 
14. Have subject note times at end of 3 and 4 
15. Have subject note time at end of 5 
16. Switch to red pencil for any additional notes 
17. Staple question list in booklet 
18. Have subject write code on back of booklet 
19. Staple booklet shut 
20. Collect: 
a. Consent form 
b. Questionnaire booklet 
c. White photo book 
d. Green photo book 
e. Set of plans and poster 
f. Clock 
g. Pens and pencil 
h. (This) Exercise Guide 
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PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
Please answer as accurately as possible and do not hesitate to ask for clarification if 
needed.  The information is anonymous.  Do not include your name.  Although the 
following information may be definitive, it will be held confidential. 
1.  My age bracket is: 
20-25 26 – 30 31 – 40 41 – 50 51 – 60 61+ 
 
2. My degrees and subjects (Civil Engineering, Architecture, Construction, etc.): 
 Bachelors   
 Masters    
 PhD.    
 
3.  My total years of design or construction experience are: 
1 – 5 6 – 10 11 – 20 21- 30  31+ 
 
4.  My total years of experience with high rises are: 
1 – 5 6 – 10 11 – 20 21- 30  31+ 
 
5.  For the last three years, my primary role has been: (check no more than 2 
boxes) 
 Student 
 The daily preparation of construction documents 
 Company executive; (CEO, President, V.P.) 
 Management of construction 
 Other (specify)      
 
6.  In relating to high rises, my specialty is:  (Place numbers 104 in boxes with 1 
as your most familiar and 4 as least). 
 High rise structural design 
 High rise architectural design 
 High rise construction management 
 High rise facilities management 
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INSTRUCTION SHEET 
(Retain throughout exercise) 
  
The following exercise consists of five sections.  The questions include short 
lists and multiple-choice questions.  You will have two hours (or more if you wish) to 
review, answer and change your answers.  Two hours is approximately the length of 
time assumed for the real events and decision-making issues to occur.  The scenario 
and questions are intended to be realistic and are not intended to revolve around 
hidden clues or tricks. 
 The information from this exercise will be summarized (without identifying 
individuals) and in a few weeks, the questions will be discussed with you and the other 
participants as a group to obtain a better understanding of the issues imbedded in the 
answers.  This study is not about correctness, but rather of the range of judgments 
and opinions by knowledgeable individuals about a complex subject. 
 Most important, treat all issues as you would in reality.  If you would refuse a 
request, then answer accordingly.  If you would make a demand, write it down.  You 
may discuss the issue with the representative in the room. 
 Some sections will be time noted for purposes of determining the time 
necessary to comprehend and complete that portion of the problem. 
 Write on the back of your sheet if you need more space.  Please note “over” on 
the front of your sheet.  If you wish to delete material, please draw a single line through 
the deleted words. 
 During the exercise, photographs showing the subject building and neighboring 
buildings will be furnished, as will a set of structural plans for reference. 
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 When you are satisfied that you understand the above information, please 
proceed with the exercise by starting the clock. 
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Section 1 
Please do not review other sections until you 
have completed the preceding section 
Use blue pen 
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Engineers Scenario (Retain throughout exercise) 
 
I The Scenario 
 All questions are based on the following scenario.  Please study it to understand the 
environment of the exercise and feel free to ask questions for clarification. 
 Your own office environment is exactly as it really is. 
 You are in your office at 3:50 PM on a Sunday afternoon having just wrapped up a 
project for a Monday afternoon presentation.  As you are walking out the door the main 
phone line rings and you pick it up at the receptionists’ desk.  A downtown building manager 
for whom your firm does extensive work says there was an explosion in his forty-story 
building at about 3:00 PM.  There appears to be serious structural damage to the exterior 
column line on the twenty-first floor. He is currently driving to the building with a police 
escort from the Woodlands and asks for a structural engineer to meet him at the building to 
assess the damage.  He says he has a set of structural plans at the building in his office, which 
he believes is accessible.  He further says the fire department and police are on the scene as 
well as his senior building engineer. 
 The building manager says he must have an answer to the question of how soon can 
your firm have a structural engineer on the scene.  You believe you are about fifteen minutes 
from the damaged building, but this is not your usual client. The client’s engineer is on 
vacation in Europe.  His experience is comparable to your own.  You do not immediately 
know where any of your other structural engineers with high-rise experience are.  You do 
know that the damaged high rise is rigid framed steel and was designed by an out of town 
engineering firm over thirty years ago, but your firm has performed work in the building for 
the last twenty years and has copies of the original plans and specifications. 
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SECTION 1 
        1.  TIME 4:00 PM. Your reply to the building manager’s request for an Engineer to 
come to the site immediately is: 
   
   
   
   
   
 
    2.  Once you have disconnected, you intend to promptly take the following actions: 
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  3.  You are unable to immediately locate your CEO or any of your firm’s experienced high-
rise engineers other than yourself.  You leave messages for all of them.  You do, however, 
locate two of your capable young engineers and a senior computer draftsman all of whom 
live within a half-hour of either your office or downtown. Your directions to them are: 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
END OF SECTION 1  
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End Section 1 
Time:  
Please return blue pen 
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Section 2 
Use red pen 
If you wish to go back and make changes to 
Section 1, use red pen.  If you wish to delete 
wording, use a single red line to mark out. 
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Continuation of Scenario (Retain throughout exercise) 
 Following your actions at the office, you are driving to the building to meet the 
building manager.  You have not yet located another engineer with substantial high-rise 
experience.  You turn on your car radio and hear a news account of the damaged building.  
An on the scene reporter says that authorities have stated that experts are on the way to 
perform a structural evaluation of the building. As you approach downtown, you can see 
damage to the subject building as shown in Figure 1.  You notice that the trees along the road 
are blowing in a breeze fifteen to twenty-five miles an hour. 
 One minute later, you are stopped at a police roadblock six blocks from the building.  
You observe that reporters are being denied access.  You identify yourself and the officer 
immediately clears you to report to the Fire Department Incident Commander in the lobby of 
the damaged building and provides an escort.  As you approach the building you can see a 
large field of broken glass from the upper window walls on the plaza.  You also notice what 
appears to be a large piece of distorted H section on the plaza perhaps five feet long.  You 
find the Incident Commander (a District Fire Chief), an assistant Police Chief, the building 
manager, and the building owner’s Vice President in an intense discussion around the lobby 
security desk with various subordinates and others, about 20 in all. On introduction, they 
greet you with relief.  The building owner’s Vice President defers to you to take charge 
representing their interests in his presence. 
 The Incident Commander gives you the following brief report on what is known. 
 None of the high-rise traction elevators are operational although the hydraulic 
elevators to the three story underground garage are working. The speculation by the  
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building manager is that power to the roof top switchgear was interrupted when the floor 
dropped.  The building engineer on duty reports that the shafts and guide rails appear to be 
intact although uneven at some points.  He believes the elevators can be operated, though 
perhaps at reduced speed, if power is restored.  Reducing the speed is a simple adjustment.  
An elevator electrician is working to restore elevator service. 
 Some water and sewer lines were ruptured necessitating shutting off water pumps. 
 Some fire sprinklers were activated by the explosion and ruptures in the vertical risers 
necessitated shutting down the fire pumps. 
 Power for lighting and wall plugs appear to be out above the twentieth floor but 
working on lower levels. 
  A single point of failure (an explosion) apparently occurred on the twenty-first floor 
at an exterior column.  The column dropped several feet and the floors above sagged into the 
shallow V of the photograph.  What is supporting the column and floors now is not clear. 
 Reports are sketchy, but state that chunks of floor concrete are still occasionally 
falling and the area near the severed column is very difficult to reach due to a tangle of 
furnishings, collapsed ceiling, wiring and large holes in the floor for several feet around the 
damaged column. 
 As the Incident Commander completes your briefing, a structural engineer you 
recognize as employed by the City Plan Checking Office walks over from the fire stair and 
introduces himself. 
 The Incident Commander suggests that rather than attempting to access the damaged 
floor that the group should observe the point of failure from the building directly across the  
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street.  The group makes a quick visit and observes the damage from several levels, trying to 
find angles to see details in the building.  At one point, the Incident Commander has to ask 
his police escort to remove a television camera crew doing a live feed so that you may access 
the best vantage point to observe the severed column.  From this visit several photos are 
made (Figures 2 through 11).  In particular observe that Photo 7 is a close-up of the severed 
column and shows that a section of several feet is missing from the column and the top cut 
appears to be resting on the stub of the column.  The city engineer who was downtown at the 
time of the explosion tells you that he had climbed to the 21st floor before you arrived and 
managed to observe the severed column from about twenty feet away for about fifteen 
minutes.  Twice he thought he saw the top section of the column lifting up from the stub an 
inch or two and then easing back into its present position.  He said the movement was 
apparently related to wind gusts but was infrequent.  He also thought he saw crushed grooves 
in the opposing steel surfaces that were perhaps resisting the top surface from sliding off.  
This grooving was not visible from across the street but the engineer said he estimates the 
grooves as a fraction of an inch deep. Photo 7 shows some detail. 
 Upon returning to the building, the building manager provides the set of structural 
drawings that you have in front of you.  The manager says critical drawings are up to date. 
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SECTION 2 
4. Having furnished this information, the Incident Commander says he knows you haven’t 
had a chance to study the situation, but asks you to judge if it is safe for fire department 
searchers to continue looking for two missing individuals on the upper floors. There are also 
a dozen police officers collecting evidence in the building and the FBI is on the way.  The 
building manager adds that his elevator electrician has left the building and is refusing to 
return without assurance that the building will not collapse.  The manager adds that the 
electrician’s cousin died in the World Trade Center and he is concerned that other critical 
personnel are about to flee the building. 
Your answer is: 
   
   
   
 
5. The CEO of your firm returns your earlier call.  He is in Istanbul. You brief him and he 
expresses concern about liability issues but gives you authority to use your own judgment, 
but to keep him informed of major decisions.  He furnishes you the firm’s lawyer’s phone 
numbers and suggests you contact them when appropriate.  After this discussion you proceed 
to: 
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6. Your cell phone rings and your firm’s most experienced high-rise engineer is on the phone 
(If you are the most experienced then this is the next most experienced).  He is the only 
experienced high-rise engineer you have been able to contact.  You brief him on the situation 
and your actions.  He informs you he is seventy-five miles north of downtown near I-45 but 
can leave immediately.  He has a cell phone with him but no computer.  He states I-45 is 
jammed with traffic at least 50 miles out from downtown.  He then asks your opinion of what 
he should do.  You glance at a clock; the time is now 5 PM.  You reply: 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
END OF SECTION 2 
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End Section 2 
Time:  
Please return red pen 
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Sections 3, 4 and 5 
Use green pen 
If you wish to go back and make changes to 
sections one or two, use green pen. If you wish to 
delete wording, use a single green line through the 
words you wish to delete. 
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SECTION 3 
7. The Incident Commander informs you that the incident is on national news, and that 
commentators are speculating about the risk of the building collapsing.  The Incident 
Commander also informs you that the Weather Channel is projecting windstorms and 
possibly high winds of 60 mph for Tuesday night (48 hours).  The Incident Commander asks 
if you have any suggestions for actions that should be taken.  You respond: 
   
   
   
   
   
8. At this point, the City Fire Chief walks up to the group while talking on his cell phone. He 
disconnects and tells the Incident Commander that the mayor is involved and that his 
conversation with the mayor was just interrupted by a call from the Governor. He speculates 
that the Governor is offering assistance; perhaps even to activate state disaster teams.  He 
hands the event commander a list and they step away for a discussion.  The Incident 
Commander turns to you and shows you a list of ten questions. (These are the basic questions 
formatted for computer analysis). 
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8. (1.) What is your estimate of maximum windstorm wind gusts the damaged building could 
survive? Assume thirty minutes of wind measured by standard Weather Service criteria at 30 
feet of elevation.  Assume the wind would be centered on the South side of the building.  The 
damaged side of the building is the West side).  Circle one: 
 40 MPH or less 50 MPH 60 MPH 70 MPH 80MPH+ 
Comments:      
       
8. (2) Given the information available, how likely is it that the building will collapse in the 
next 24 hours, assuming winds that do not exceed 25 MPH (at 30 feet elevation). 
Circle one: 
 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
8. (3) Given the information available, how much forewarning of collapse would there be, 
assuming high winds were not involved.  Circle one: 
 NONE  A FEW SECONDS    A MINUTE   
 AN HOUR PROBABLY NOT PREDICTABLE 
8. (4)  What activities or occurrences, other than high winds, do you foresee possibly 
endangering the building while it is damaged? 
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8. (5) Assuming you believed the collapse of the building to be possible during business 
hours on Monday, how large an area do you believe should be evacuated in terms of city 
blocks radius from the building?  Circle one. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ 
Comments       
       
       
8. (6) Assuming that the building were to topple against a similar building across the street 
and in the direction of a continuous line of high rise buildings, what is the possibility that a 
collapse could result in a series of building failures like a line of dominos?  Circle one: 
 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Comments       
       
       
8. (7) If this building were to collapse under a 60 MPH East wind as described in question 
11, how do you believe the building would collapse? Circle one: 
 COLLAPSE VERTICALLY (WTC) TOPPLE FROM BASE 
 TOPPLE FROM 21st FLOOR NO IDEA 
 OTHER (comments below) 
Comments       
       
       
8. (8) How much time would it take to properly analyze the structural condition of the 
building for temporary repairs? 
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8. (9) What significant information about either the building’s condition or the situation do 
you need to continue your analysis.  Please list. 
   
   
   
   
8. (10) If your firm’s insurer were to void this project’s liability coverage, would you 
continue to serve as consultant?  Please explain what you would require to continue. 
   
   
   
 
END OF SECTION 3 
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Please proceed to Section 4 
Time   
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SECTION 4 
 
9. How small a package could conceal plastic explosive (C4) capable of severing an 18-inch 
H section with 1.5 inch flanges in two places?  Assume 50 KSI steel. 
Circle one: 
PURSE SMALL BRIEFCASE LARGE BRIEFCASE 
SMALL SUITECASE LARGE SUITECASE 
 
10. You observed that an 18-inch H section five feet long was blown completely out of the 
building.  In your opinion, how long would it have taken one trained individual to quietly set 
such explosive charges (including the relatively quiet removal of gypsum board wall and 
fire insulation) that would produce this result?  Circle one: 
 ½ HOUR 1 HOUR 2 HOURS 4 HOURS 8 HOURS 
 
END OF SECTION 4 
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Please proceed to Section 5 
Time   
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SECTION 5 
 
II  Key Decisions and Solutions 
 Assuming that you have agreed to proceed with the engineering for a solution to the 
problem, several key decisions must be made. 
Decision #1:  A yes/no decision for an engineering/construction response to impending storm 
winds.  Would you initiate work to increase the building’s ability to survive anticipated storm 
winds of 60 MPH (measured at 30 ft) expected in 48 hours.  Circle one: 
 YES  NO (No Decision is a NO) 
 
Decision #2A:  What possible solutions would you review that might reduce the chance of 
the building collapsing uncontrolled during the windstorm in 48 hours.  Please list and 
number your ideas. 
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Decision #3:  Assuming you decided to initiate some action, which of your ideas would you 
use.  Please explain your reasons briefly. 
  
  
  
  
  
Decision #4:  Assuming that the building survives the coming storm, do you believe the 
building can be permanently repaired?  Please circle one.  If yes, briefly state how you would 
approach the repair of the collapsed portion. 
 YES NO 
If yes, explain: 
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Decision #5:  If decision #2 had been not to attempt to stabilize the building, are there other 
possible 48 hour alternatives to reduce risk to surrounding buildings from a catastrophic 
collapse during the wind storm?  Please list any other options, remembering that the full 
resources of local, state and federal government have been offered to you. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
END OF SECTION 5 
END OF EXERCISE, ALL OF YOUR SHEETS ARE AVAILABLE.  PLEASE 
REVIEW ALL OF YOUR ANSWERS AND MAKE ANY CHANGES YOU WISH 
WITH THE RED PENCIL. 
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APPENDIX E 
ORIGINAL CALCULATIONS 
(DELETED FOR CAUSE) 
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APPENDIX F 
EXTENDED DOMINO THEORY 
(DELETED FOR CAUSE) 
  
 
